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Recent Decisions
ENFORCEMENT OF THE MARYLAND WETLANDS ACT
"BOGS DOWN" IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Hirsch v. MarylandDepartment of NaturalResources
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hirsch v. MarylandDepartmentof NaturalResources' the Maryland Court of Appeals held that an Anne Arundel waterfront landowner' could not be required to restore wetlands filled in violation of
rules and regulations3 promulgated under the Maryland Wetlands Act 4
by the Department of Natural Resources.5 The Court of Appeals held
that the Department had failed to comply with the Act's filing requirements 6 and that this failure rendered void and unenforceable the rules
and regulations for Anne Arundel County's wetlands.7
The Hirsch opinion is somewhat obscure. It is unclear whether the
court held Anne Arundel County regulations void as to all private wetlands owners,8 or only as to those who, like Hirsch, purchased subse1. 288 Md. 95, 416 A.2d 10 (1980) (opinion by Eldridge, J.).
2. The appellants in the case were three brothers, John, William and Robert Hirsch,
and their respective wives, Mary, Elizabeth and Glenda Hirsch. In keeping with the practice
in the Court of Appeals' opinion, id. at 98, 416 A.2d at 11, this recent decision will refer to
the members of the Hirsch family collectively as Hirsch. The property involved was five
waterfront lots on Cornfield Creek, a tributary of the Magothy River. Id. at 104, 416 A.2d at
15.
3. STATE OF MD. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, ORDER ESTABLISHING WETLANDS BOUNDARIES AND RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND, §§ IVA, V (1973).
4. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to 9-501 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981), at the time
of the filling codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 718-734 (1970). References will be to
the current codification, since any differences in wording "are not relevant to [the] resolution

of this case," 288 Md. at 97 n.1, 416 A.2d at II n.l.
For an overview of the Maryland Wetlands Act, the problems it addressed and those
it created, see Comment, Maryland's Wetlands- The Legal Quagmire, 30 MD. L. REV. 240
(1970).
5. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-302(a) (1974) empowers the Secretary of Natural
Resources to "promulgate rules and regulations governing dredging, filling, removing, or
otherwise altering or polluting private wetlands." Further, § 9-301(a) requires that "[t]he
Secretary shall promptly delineate the landward boundaries of any wetlands in the state"
and display such delineations on suitable maps.

6. Id. § 9-301(c). See note 84 infra.
7. 288 Md. at 118, 416 A.2d at 22.
8. See notes 77 to 81 and accompanying text infra.
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quent to the filing failure and without notice of the regulations.9 If the
latter interpretation of the court's holding is correct, the court's decision
is justified. If, however, the former interpretation is correct, then the
decision presents significant problems.
The Hirsch opinion also leaves unsettled other important questions. What weight is to be accorded administrative findings in a subsequent circuit court enforcement action?' ° What is the Department's
burden of proof in establishing the boundary between state and private
wetlands when the landowner has obscured c the boundary, and what
must the Department establish in order to meet that burden?" An
overview of the Wetlands Act provides a useful introduction to an
analysis of these questions.
Maryland Wetlands Act
With approximately 3,200 miles of coastline,' 2 primarily along the
perimeter of the estuarian system formed by the Chesapeake Bay and
its tributaries, Maryland has an abundance of land covered or affected
by tidal waters.' 3 Recognizing that such areas could be threatened by
unregulated landfill, dredging or other activities, the Maryland General
Assembly enacted the Wetlands Act of 1970.4 The preamble to the
Act declares that "[ilt is therefore the public policy of the state, taking
into account varying ecological, economic, developmental, recreational, and aesthetic values, to preserve the wetlands and prevent their
despoliation and destruction."'"
The Act creates a bipartite regulatory system that distinguishes
"state wetlands" from "private wetlands." State wetlands include all
land under navigable waters of the state at mean high tide, excepting
any such land that has been transferred by valid grant.' 6 Private wetlands are any lands bordering on or lying beneath tidal waters that
17
support aquatic growth and that do not qualify as state wetlands.
The use restrictions applicable to state wetlands are concise and direct:
9. See notes 82 to 96 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 117 to 125 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 105 to 116 and accompanying text infra.
12. 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Maryland 566-67 (1974).
13. In addition to the 1.6 million acres of land under the Bay, its tributaries and the
Atlantic coast estuaries, there are more than 300,000 acres of swamps and marshes subject to
at least intermittent submersion or inundation by tidal action. II MARYLAND STATE PLANNING DEP'T, WETLANDS IN MARYLAND - TECHNICAL REPORT 11-5 (1970), cited in Com-

ment, supra note 4, at 240.
14. See note 4 supra.
15. MD. NAT. RES. CODE
16. Id. § 9-101(m).
17. Id. § 9-101(j).

ANN. §

9-102.
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"A person may not dredge or fill on state wetlands, without a license."' 8 Such simplicity and directness is possible because state wetlands are, by definition, state property and completely subject to state
control. '9
Restrictions on private wetlands, which limit the use of private interests in land, must be promulgated in accordance with a more complex procedure. After completing boundary maps 20 of, and adopting

proposed rules and regulations 2' for, all wetlands in each political subdivision, the Secretary of Natural Resources 22 must hold a public hearing in each county with such wetlands. The Secretary is required to

provide published public notice of the hearing and individual notice to
each person shown on the tax records as an owner of land containing
designated wetlands.23 After considering the rights of every affected

property owner, the testimony at the hearing, and any other pertinent
facts, the Secretary must establish by order the landward bounds of
each wetland area and the rules and regulations applicable to each.2 4

The order and a copy of the map depicting the wetlands' boundary
lines are to be filed among the county's land records. 25 Finally, the

Secretary must notify each recorded owner 26 of designated wetlands by
sending each a copy of the order by registered or certified mail. He
18. Id § 9-202(a). For license procedure, see id § 9-202(b)-(e).
19. The Court of Appeals recently has traced the history of the property interest in state
wetlands:
The lands in Maryland covered by water were granted to the Lord Proprietor by Section 4 of the Charter from King Charles I to Caecillius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore, his
heirs, successors and assigns, who had the power to dispose of such lands, subject to the
public rights of fishing and navigation. By virtue of Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights
in the Maryland Constitution, the inhabitants of Maryland became entitled to all property derived from and under the Charter and thereafter the State of Maryland had the
same title to, and rights in, such lands under water as the Lord Proprietor had previously held. These lands were held by the State for the benefit of the inhabitants of
Maryland and this holding is of a general fiduciary character.
Kerpelman v. Board of Public Works, 261 Md. 436, 445, 276 A.2d 56, 61 (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
20. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-301(a).

21. Id. § 9-302.
22. Although the Act refers to "the Secretary" as the acting party in its provisions, the
actual work is of course largely completed by agency staff personnel. In this discussion,
"Secretary" and "Department" are used to refer to actions of the various Department of
Natural Resources personnel.
23. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-301(b).

24. Id. § 9-301(c).
25. Id. See note 84 infra.
26. Note that notice to the "owner of record" is required, id. (emphasis added), rather
than the "owner shown on tax records" as required for the hearing notice, id. § 9-301(b)
(emphasis added).
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must also publish the order in a local newspaper.2 7
The Act also prescribes procedures for an extensive appeal process. Any person with a recorded interest in land affected by a rule or
regulation may appeal the rule or regulation, or the land's designation
as wetland, to a departmental review board, and if still dissatisfied, may
petition for relief in that county's circuit court. 28 Both the Secretary
and the landowner have standing to appeal an adverse decision to the
Court of Special Appeals.29
FactualSetting and ProceedingsBelow
In accordance with the requirements of the Act,3 0 the Department 3 ' inventoried all state and private wetlands, prepared boundary
maps,3 2 and developed proposed rules and regulations. In 1972, the
task was completed, and on October 25, 1972, the Department sent individual notices of the Anne Arundel County hearing and copies of the
proposed regulations to all persons listed on the tax records as owners
of Anne Arundel County private wetlands.3 3 Although the land at issue in Hirsch actually had been transferred to Hirsch's predecessor in
interest at this time, the transfer was not recorded until October 31,
1972. As a result, the notice was sent to the owner then listed on the tax
records, a Maryland corporation. 34 Apparently, neither the corporation nor the actual owner, who was both the secretary-treasurer of the
corporation and the wife of its president, received the hearing notice.3 5
27. Id. § 9-301(c).
28. Id. §§ 9-304, 9-305.
29. Id. § 9-305 (d).
30. See notes 20 to 27 and accompanying text supra.
31. See note 22 supra.
32. In 1971, the Department contracted with Raytheon Corporation to identify wetlands
using aerial photographs. Raytheon subcontracted with Dr. Jack McCormack, an ecology
expert and botanist, to interpret Anne Arundel County's photographs identifying the wetlands by the presence of certain vegetation. McCormack was not required to differentiate
between state and private wetlands. State Dep't of Natural Resources v. Hirsch, Equity No.
22763 at 3 (Md. Cir. Ct., Anne Arundel County, June 14, 1978).
33. 288 Md. at 104, 416 A.2d at 15.
34. Id.
35. Id. Although no notice was received, the Department had complied with the requirement of MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-301(b) that "each owner shown on tax records
as an owner of [designated wetlands]" (emphasis added) be notified. As of October 25, 1972,
the corporation, Emerson Development Company, was listed on the tax records as owner of
the lots, and Hirsch's predecessor in interest, a Mrs. Szymanski, did not record until October
31, 1972. 288 Md. at 104, 416 A.2d at 15. The Department sent notice to the corporation's
listed resident agent, who had moved from his listed address four years earlier, without
notifying the state of the change of address as required by MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§ 2-108(b) (1975). Therefore the failure of notification would seem to fall squarely on the
corporation and its agent, and on Mrs. Szymanski for failing to record in a timely fashion.
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After the hearing, the Secretary signed the final order on January
25, 1973, establishing the boundaries of Anne Arundel County's wetlands and adopting the applicable rules and regulations.3 6 The Department again used the tax record mailing list to send copies of the
finalized order to the wetlands landowners3 7 in September, 1973. Notice was again sent to the corporation, and Hirsch's immediate predecessor, who by then had recorded the transfer and was thus entitled to
notice, failed to receive notice that the lots in question contained wetlands subject to use regulation. 38 A representative of the Department
delivered a copy of the order, with maps showing designated wetlands,
to the clerk of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in August,
1973.39 Subsequently, the order and the copy of the wetlands regulations were misplaced, and the maps were put in a file cabinet inaccessible to the public and to a title searcher."
Hirsch purchased the land in question in July, 1974. 4' Since
neither the professional title searcher hired by Hirsch 42 nor Hirsch's
predecessor apparently knew of or discovered the wetlands designation,
neither informed Hirsch of any wetlands restrictions on the land. 43 In
July and August, Hirsch began to clear brush and debris from the land
in preparation for a filling operation." After receiving a complaint
about possible wetlands violation, a representative from the Department contacted Hirsch. 45 Although Hirsch contended otherwise at
trial, 46 he apparently received a warning, before or during the time wetlands were being filled, that such filling would be in violation of wetlands regulations. 47 Because Hirsch continued to fill even after several
36. 288 Md. at 104-05, 416 A.2d at 15.

37. Id. at 105, 416 A.2d at 15. Since the Act required that the "owner of record" be
notified, see note 26 supra, and the Department's list was compiled from the tax records

some 10 months previously, the second notice was not in compliance with MD. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. § 9-301(c).

38. 288 Md. at 105, 416 A.2d at 15. There was some evidence that the corporation's
resident agent's secretary may have received the notice, id., but the owner of record, Mrs.
Szymanski, did not receive notice as required by MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 9-301(c). See
note 26 and accompanying text supra.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

288 Md. at 105, 416
1d.
Id. at 106, 416 A.2d
Id.
Id. at 117, 416 A.2d
Id. at 106, 416 A.2d
Id.

A.2d at 15.
at 16.
at 22.
at 16.

46. See id.
47. The Court of Appeals found that
[Tihe trial court did not at any time expressly resolve the credibility issue presented by
the dispute in the testimony about the actual content of the telephone conversation
[between Hirsch and the Department's Representative]. . . . [Ilt cannot be determined
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visits by inspectors from the Department, 8 the Department issued an
administrative order on December 12, 1974, requiring Hirsch to cease
filling and submit a plan for restoring wetlands already filled. 49 At
Hirch's request, the Department held an administrative hearing.5 °
After finding that Hirsch had filled both state and private wetlands in
knowing violation of the regulations, 5 the Department reaffirmed its
administrative order.5 2
When Hirsch failed to comply with the reaffirmed order, the Department asked the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to enjoin
any further filling and to order Hirsch to restore the filled wetlands.5 3
Judge Wray determined that wetlands had been filled,5 4 but concluded
that the state had not produced sufficient evidence to prove that Hirsch
had filled state, as opposed to private, wetlands. 55 Consequently, he
treated all the filled wetlands on the Hirsch property as private, rather
than state, wetlands.56 Moreover, Judge Wray held that the Department's maps, rules, regulations and orders had to be recorded among
the land records in accordance with the Maryland Recording Act.5 7 He
from the trial court's opinion, and the evidence is in conflict, whether Hirsch had received actual notice before he began filling wetlands.
Id. at 110 n.8, 416 A.2d at 18 n.8. However, as noted by the Court of Special Appeals,
although it is not entirely clear from the record how much of the wetlands had been
filled at the various times when contact was had with the State officials, both sides agree
that no wetlands had been filled prior to Mr. Smith's [the Department's representative]
inspection of the site on August 9, 1974, or, thusly, prior to [the telephone conversation]
shortly thereafter.
42 Md. App. 457, 483-84, 401 A.2d 491, 506. The circuit court opinion stated that "[o]nly
after [the Hirsches] had begun to fill the property did they become aware of possible wetlands' violations when a Water Resources investigator called Mary Hirsch to warn her of the
possiblepresence of wetlands." Equity No. 22763, slip op. at 2 (emphasis added). Clearly,
the circuit court did resolve the credibility issue regarding the content of the phone call, in
favor of the Department, and, since the parties agreed that no wetlands were filled prior to
the telephone conversation, it is also clear that any wetlands filled were filled after actual
notice. The filling of the "property" prior to the warning mentioned by the circuit court
could refer to the uncontested fact that some brush had been cut and piled on the property
above the wetlands. 42 Md. App. 457, 468, 401 A.2d 491, 497-98.
48. 288 Md. at 106, 416 A.2d at 16.
49. Water Resources Administration, Order C-0-75-202 (1974).
50. See 288 Md. at 107, 416 A.2d at 16.
51. Findings of Fact and Conclusions, Administrative Hearing re: WRA Order C-0-75205 (1975).
52. Water Resources Administration, Supplemental Order C-0-75-202A (1975).
53. State Dep't of Natural Resources v. Hirsch, Equity No. 22763 (Md. Cir. Ct., Anne
Arundel County, June 14, 1978); see 288 Md. at 107, 416 A.2d at 16.
54. Equity No. 22763, slip op. at 4.
55. Id. at 5. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra.
56. Equity No. 22763, slip op. at 5. But see notes 105 to 116 and accompanying text
infra.
57. Equity No. 22763, slip op. at 7. The circuit court held that the filing requirement of
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reasoned that such compliance was a prerequisite to enforcing the Department's rules and concluded that because the Department had not
formally recorded these documents in Anne Arundel County, Hirsch
could not be ordered to restore his wetlands. The court held, however,
that further filling by Hirsch would require a permit.58
Though the Court of Special Appeals agreed that the Department
had failed to satisfy the Act's notice and filing requirements,5 9 Judge
Wilner, writing for the court, held that Hirsch did not have standing to
assert the Department's failure to notify his predecessor.6 ° Moreover,
he concluded that Hirsch's receipt of actual notice before the wetlands
were filled cured the lack of constructive notice to him when he bought
the property.61 On this basis, the Court of Special Appeals reversed
and remanded for an order compelling Hirsch to restore the filled
wetlands.6 2
COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION

Like both lower courts, the Court of Appeals found that the Department had failed to comply with the Act's notice and filing requirements. 63 The Court of Appeals, however, held that Hirsch had
standing to assert the Department's filing failure and that the Department's error rendered void the rules and regulations governing Anne
Arundel County wetlands.'
Finding that the Act's filing requirement demanded more than
mere delivery to the Clerk of the Court in each county, 65 the court conMD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-301(c) "comes within the scope of [MD. REAL PROP. CODE

ANN. § 3-101 (1974)] and must comply with it." Equity No. 22763, slip op. at 7.
58. Equity No. 22763, slip op. at 7.
59. 42 Md. App. at 474, 480, 401 A.2d at 501, 504.
60. Since the court held that the intent of the notice to landowners requirement of MD.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-301(c) was to afford current landowners the opportunity to appeal, see note 28 and accompanying text supra, Hirsch, who was not the landowner at the
time of the failure of notice could not raise any deficiency of notice to a predecessor as a
defense. 42 Md. App. at 474-75, 401 A.2d at 501.
61. 42 Md. App. at 483-84, 401 A.2d at 505-06.
62. Id. at 484, 401 A.2d at 506. Because Hirsch was held not to have standing to assert
the notice and filing defects in the promulgation of private wetlands rules and regulations,
but see notes 67 & 68 and accompanying text infra, the Court of Special Appeals did not
address the several questions relating to the location of the state/private wetland boundary,
noting only that "there was substantial evidence from which the court could have reasonably
concluded that the wetlands in question were private, rather than state wetlands. . . . [W]e
cannot say that the ultimate determination was clearly erroneous." 42 Md. App. at 472, 401
A.2d at 500. But see notes 105 to 116 and accompanying text infra.
63. 288 Md. at 110-112, 416 A.2d at 18-19 (construing MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 9301(b) and (c)).
64. 288 Md. at 110, 416 A.2d at 18.
65. Id. at 111, 416 A.2d at 18.
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strued the Act to require some form of permanent record "among the
66
land records" and accessible to anyone checking title to the property.
Because the Court of Appeals found that the filing requirement was
intended to protect and provide notice to subsequent purchasers,6 7 it
reasoned that Hirsch, as a subsequent purchaser, had standing to assert
the Department's failure to comply. 68 As the court noted, at the time
Hirsch took title, he had neither actual nor constructive notice; accordingly, notice subsequent to the purchase could not cure the Department's omission.6 9
Having established Hirsch's standing, the court next considered
the effect of the Department's failure to comply with the Act's filing
requirements. The Department argued that despite the filing defects,
the rules and regulations were nonetheless valid and enforceable because the legislature had not expressly conditioned their validity on
compliance with the requirements. 70 The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, 7' concluding that the statutory language "shall be filed
among the land records" indicated the legislature's intent to mandate
filing of the rules and regulations. The court reasoned that the legislature must have intended to condition the rules' enforceability on satisfaction of the filing requirement; otherwise, the court noted, "little

66. Id. at 111-12, 416 A.2d at 18-19.
67. Id. at 113-14, 416 A.2d at 19.

68. Id. at 114, 416 A.2d at 20. The court also noted that the Wetlands Act gives standing
to challenge a rule or regulation to "'[any person who has a recorded interest in land affected by any rule or regulation promulgated under this subtitle.'" Id. at 114-15, 416 A.2d
at 20 (quoting MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-304). In addition, the Court of Appeals
strongly suggested that the Department's failure to notify the previous owner properly also
might give Hirsch standing. 288 Md. at 117 n.9, 416 A.2d at 22 n.9.
69. The Court of Appeals noted that had actual notice after purchase been significant,
the case should have been remanded for clarification of whether such notice in fact had been
given prior to the filling. 288 Md. at 110 n.8, 416 A.2d at 18 n.8. But see notes 46 & 47 and
accompanying text supra.
70. 288 Md. at 113, 115, 416 A.2d at 19, 21.
71. The Court of Appeals also found unpersuasive the Department's argument that wetlands regulations, like zoning laws, could be imposed even without notice. The court noted
that zoning restrictions are not required to be filed "among the land records" and that the
wetlands regulations apply only to specific tracts of land, rather than to large general areas
as zoning laws do. Id. at 115, 416 A.2d at 20-21. The Department's citation to Quynn v.
Brooke, 22 Md. 288 (1864) (cited incorrectly in the opinion and briefs as Quynn v. Carroll's
Adm'r), in which the Court of Appeals held that the failure to file a certificate attesting to
the oath of a public commissioner did not invalidate the effect of the oath-taking, was also
unpersuasive to the Court. The Court of Appeals quoted with approval from the Court of
Special Appeals' opinion that "'there is a significant difference between assuring that adequate public notice is given of restrictions on the use of land and seeing to it that some
record is made of the fact that a minor functionary has taken an oath of office.'" 288 Md. at
116, 416 A.2d at 21, quoting 42 Md. App. at 482, 401 A.2d at 505.
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purpose would be served by the statutory requirement. 7 2 The court
also observed that conditioning the validity of the rules and regulations
on such compliance was the only effective sanction for failure to comply with the requirements. 3 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held
that the failure to comply with the filing requirements voided the rules
and regulations during the time in question. 4 Because Hirsch had not
violated any valid rules or regulations, the Department could not compel him to restore the filled wetlands. 75 The Court of Appeals, therefore, reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and
remanded the case with instructions to affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the Department's suit against Hirsch.7 6
The Ambiguity of the Hirsch Opinion
Part of the Hirsch opinion suggests that the court held the Anne
Arundel County wetlands regulations totally void; part suggests that
the court held them void only as against landowners in Hirsch's position. The court refers to the rules and regulations as "invalid during
the times pertinent to this case," 77 "totally void,"71 8 or "totally inva72. 288 Md. at 116, 416 A.2d at 21.
73. Id. It is hard to see that invalidating the rules and regulations in oto is the only
effective sanction. One narrower sanction would be to hold that the Department is estopped
from enforcing the rules and regulations against those without constructive or actual notice.
Under this standard, Hirsch could not be required to restore wetlands filled prior to actual
notice, but would be responsible for any filling after such notice.
Hirsch might also have a cause of action for any demonstrable injury sustained as a
result of the failure of notice, such as excess consideration paid for the property over the
property's actual value with such restrictions. The intent of the Wetlands Act, to protect the
wetlands against unregulated despoliation, would be fulfilled to a greater degree by such an
interpretation. See notes 83 to 104 and accompanying text infra.
74. 288 Md. at 118, 416 A.2d at 22.
75. Id. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-501(d) provides that "[any person who knowingly violates any provision of this title is liable to the state for restoration of the affected
wetland to its condition prior to the violation if possible." MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 9510(a) and (b) provide fines and imprisonment for violations "of this title." Section 9-510(c)
extends the penalties of §§ 9-510(a) and (b) to "violation[s] of any rule or regulation adopted
• . . pursuant to . . . this title." However, § 9-510(d), which authorizes restoration of affected wetlands for knowing violations "of this title," does not include violations of rules
and regulations, at least by its terms. The Court of Appeals noted in Hirsch "that as originally enacted . . . the Act provided for restoration upon a knowing violation of either the
'rules and regulations or any provision of this subheading,'" and "the Revisor's Note [for
the recodification] does not contain any indication that a substantive change was intended."
288 Md. at 103 n.5, 416 A.2d at 14 n.5 (quoting MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-305 (1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1980)). In light of its holding in Hirsch, it was not necessary for the Court of
Appeals to determine whether restoration could be ordered for a knowing violation of rules
and regulations, and the court reserved judgment on the point. Id.
76. 288 Md. at 118, 416 A.2d at 22.
77. Id. at 110, 416 A.2d at 18.
78. Id. at 114, 416 A.2d at 20.
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lid." 79 Although these terms are used to describe Hirsch's argument,
the court found his argument "dispositive." 8 ° The court's conclusion
also suggests that the court meant to hold the regulations void as to all
Anne Arundel County wetlands owners:
[W]e believe that administrative compliance with the notification
and filing requirements of § 9-301(c) is a condition precedent to
the validity of the regulations governing private wetlands. Because § 9-301(c) had not been complied with at the time Hirsch
filled his property, these 1973 purported regulations for Anne Arundel County private wetlands furnished no basis for ordering a
restoration of the land to its prior condition."'
On the other hand, the court's reasoning focused on the Department's failure to file as that affected subsequent purchasers; 82 thus the
court may have intended to hold the Anne Arundel County regulations
void only as to subsequent bona fide purchasers for value and without
notice, such as Hirsch.
The Court's Appraisalof Legislative Intent
Although it is unclear whether the Court of Appeals held the regulations void as to all Anne Arundel County wetland owners, or void
only as to owners in Hirsch's position, it is clear that the court claimed
to base its decision on the legislature's intent.8 3 The court, however,
faced a serious obstacle in attempting to determine the legislature's intent, for the Act is silent as to the effect of non-compliance with its
filing requirements. In the face of this silence, the court focused on the
language of the filing requirement 84 and reasoned that by mandating
79. Id. at 115, 416 A.2d at 20.
80. Id. at 110, 416 A.2d at 18.

81. Id. at 118, 416 A.2d at 22 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 113-15, 416 A.2d at 20-21.
83. See id. at 118, 416 A.2d at 22.
84. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(c) OrderestablisAhing bounds, rules and regulations; notice of order. - After considering the testimony at the hearing and any other pertinent fact, considering the rights of
every affected property owner, and the purposes of this subtitle, the Secretary shall
establish by order the landward bounds of each wetland and the rules and regulations
applicable to it. A copy of the order, together with a copy of the map depicting the
boundary lines, shall be filed among the land records in every county affected after final
appeal has been completed. The Secretary shall give notice of the order to each owner
of record of any land designated as wetlands by mailing a copy of the order to the
owner by registered or certified mail. The Secretary shall also publish the order in a
newspaper published within and having a general circulation in every county where the
wetlands are located.
MD. NAT. RES.CODE ANN. § 9-301(c). This is the language of the 1974 volume, as considered by the court. The 1981 Cumulative Supplement contains the modified language, ad-
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compliance, 5 the legislature must have intended to establish compliance as a condition precedent to the validity of rules and regulations
promulgated under the Act.
If the court meant to suggest that the legislature intended the regulations for an entire county to be invalidated by the Department's failure to comply with the filing requirement, the court's conclusion is
questionable at best. First, the express purpose of the statute was to
protect Maryland's wetlands from unregulated despoliage.86 This underlying purpose would have been poorly served by a scheme that contemplated completely invalidating regulations because of technical
defects.8" Second, had the legislature intended the overall validity of
the Department's regulations to depend on compliance with the filing
requirements, it might easily have said so. In a number of other statutes, the legislature has expressly conditioned the validity of adminisding "in accordance with subsection (d) of this section" after "land records" in the second
sentence. See notes 102-104 and accompanying text infra.
85. The Court of Appeals put great emphasis on the presumption that mandatory intent
derived from the use of the word "shall" in the Act's filing requirement. 288 Md. at 116, 416
A.2d at 21. While use of the word "shall" is generally presumed to indicate a mandatory
intent, this presumption will yield if the context of the statute indicates otherwise. See, e.g.,
Resetar v. State Bd. of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 548, 399 A.2d 225, 231, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838
(1979); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533, 325 A.2d 718, 721 (1974). In
Pope v. Secretary of Personnel, 46 Md. App. 716, 420 A.2d 1017 (1980), the Court of Special
Appeals noted that in recent years, the Court of Appeals has applied the principle with
increasing rigidity, raising the presumption of mandatory intent to an almost conclusive
level. In Hirsch, there was no discussion of the context of the Act as affecting the mandatory
intent presumed from the use of "shall." Although the court's inference that the filing requirement was intended to be mandatory is reasonable, a fuller discussion of the Act as a
whole would have been more appropriate, in light of the standards set forth in Reselar and
Frank. See note 87 infra.
86. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-102.
87. The provisions of the Act provide some support for the inference that the legislature
was concerned about preserving the general validity of wetlands regulations. For instance,
when a landowner successfully challenges a rule or a regulation as an unreasonable exercise
of the state's police power, the Act limits the reviewing court to "enter[ing] a finding that the
rule or regulation does not apply to the petitioner [and] the finding may not affect any land
other than that of the petitioner." Id. § 9-305(c). It is evident that the legislature required
the court to apply the narrowest corrective measure, presumably to leave unimpaired the
challenged rule's general validity.
Further, two specific provisions of the Act were apparently included to avoid the
chance that the Act or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder would be held to constitute an uncompensated taking in unreasonable exercise of the state's police power. MD.
NAT, RES. CODE ANN. § 9-103 states that "[t]he provisions of this title do not transfer the
title or ownership of any land or interest in land," and id. § 9-303 says that,
"[n]otwithstanding any rule or regulation promulgated by the Secretary to protect private
wetlands, the following uses are lawful on private wetland." If title to wetlands was transferred, or if the owner was denied all reasonable use of the property, this would amount to
an uncompensated taking in violation of constitutional protections. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V, XIV; Comment, supra note 4, at 256-59.
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trative actions on compliance with filing or other procedural
requirements.8 8
In fact, the court cited cases89 involving these statutes for the proposition that failure to comply with specific notice requirements invalidates administrative action. The court, however, failed to note the
difference between these statutes and the Wetlands Act. Each of these
statutes expressly established compliance with procedural requirements
as preconditions for the validity of an administrative action.
For example, in Board of County Commissioners of Garrett County
v. Bolden,9° a taxpayer's suit challenged the action of the County Commissioners in setting the property tax rate in excess of the constant yield
rate.9" The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
the action was invalid. It stressed that the commissioners had not followed proper notice procedures 9 2 and that the statute at issue specified
"[a] tax rate in excess of the constant yield tax rate may not be levied

until the taxing authority implements the following [notice] procedure." 93 The validity of the Commissioner's action, therefore, was conditioned expressly on compliance with the notice requirements. In
each of the other cases cited, the applicable statute unambiguously prescribed that compliance with the notice requirements was a condition
precedent to valid administrative action.94
88. See statutes cited note 94 infra.
89. Board of County Comm'rs v. Bolden, 287 Md. 440, 413 A.2d 190 (1980); Williams v.
Public Service Comm'n, 277 Md. 415, 354 A.2d 437 (1976); Bethesda Management Servs,
Inc. v. Department of Licensing & Regulation, 276 Md. 619, 350 A.2d 390 (1976); Rasnake
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 268 Md. 295, 300 A.2d 651 (1973); Maryland Tobacco Growers' Ass'n v. Maryland Tobacco Auth., 267 Md. 20, 296 A.2d 578 (1972).
90. 287 Md. 440, 413 A.2d 190 (1980).
91. Id. at 441, 413 A.2d at 190-91.
92. Id. at 448, 413 A.2d at 194.
93. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 232c(d) (1981) (emphasis added) (quoted in 287 Md. at
448, 413 A.2d at 194).
94. In Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 277 Md. 415, 354 A.2d 437 (1976), the statute
at issue provided that "[tihe [Public Service] Commission may by regulation passed after due
notice and opportunityfor interestedparties to be heard prescribe standards .......
MD.
ANN. CODE art. 78, § 73(a) (1981) (emphasis added). Furthermore, "[e]very ... regulation
of the Commission shall be prima facie correct and shall be affirmed unless clearly shown to
be . . .(3) made upon unlawful procedure ....
" MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 73(a) (1981)
(emphasis supplied). In Bethesda Management Serv's. Inc. v. Department of Licensing &
Regulation, 276 Md. 619, 350 A.2d 390 (1976), the statute at issue provided that "the decision . . .shall not be made until a proposal for decision . . .has been served upon the
parties ...... MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 253 (1978) (emphasis supplied). In Rasnake v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 268 Md. 295, 300 A.2d 651 (1973), the statute at issue provided
that "[tihe regulations ...
set forth in this ordinance may from time to time be amended
. . .provided however that no such action may be taken until after a public hearing. . . . At
least fifteen day's notice. . . shall be published in a newspaper .. " CECIL COUNTY, MD.
CODE §§ 47-49(a) (Michie Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). Finally, in Maryland Tobacco
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The Wetlands Act contains no comparable language. Arguably
the absence of such language reflects a legislative decision not to condition the overall validity of Wetland regulations on compliance with the
filing requirement.
Finally, it seems reasonable to suppose that the legislature intended the Act's filing requirement to have the same effect as the statutory requirement that conveyances of land be recorded. In fact, the
court noted that although the purpose of the notice requirement was to
inform existing landowners of encumbrances on their land, 9 5 the purpose of the Wetland's filing requirement, like those of other recording
statutes, was to alert persons with a prospective interest in the land.96
Although the court did not explore all the implications of this
analogy, it would have been fruitful to do so. Because the Act permits
the Department to impose rules and regulations similar to restrictive
covenants or easements, the Department might be viewed as a "purchaser" of an interest in private wetlands at the time of rulemaking. If
the transfer was effective, a subsequent purchaser of the wetlands
would take subject to the interest acquired by the Department. The
issue posed in Hirsch, then, is what effect an improperly "recorded"
prior transfer of an interest in land has on a subsequent transfer. In
Maryland, an unrecorded conveyance of an interest in land has been
described as a conveyance of an equitable interest that, despite the
mandatory nature of the recording acts, is effective as between the parties and against all persons with actual knowledge of the conveyance, 97
but ineffective against a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value and
without notice of the defect at the time he takes title, who records
before the prior purchaser. 98 In Hirsch, the Department completed the
"conveyance" by issuing the order establishing the rules and regulations, but failed to "record" by filing as required by the Act. Hirsch,
therefore, took legal title to the property without constructive or actual
notice of the Department's prior interest at the time he took title; and as
a bona fide purchaser, he was entitled to priority. Under this analysis,
the Court of Appeals was correct in asserting that Hirsch could not be
Growers' Ass'n v. Maryland Tobacco Auth., 267 Md. 20, 296 A.2d 5788 (1972), the statute at
issue, provided that "[e]very... agency of the State government ... who has the power to
make, promulgate, adopt or enforce rules and regulations shall file copies thereof [in specified locations]. No rule or regulation.

. .

is effective until after compliance with this section."

MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 9 (1978) (emphasis supplied).
95. 288 Md. at 113, 416 A.2d at 20.

96. Id. at 113-14, 416 A.2d at 20.
97. A. Soled, Robin Hood Was Right, or, Never Trust a Sheriff The Relationship Between
Sheriffs' Sales and the MarylandRecording Act, 38 Md. L. Rev. 633, 639-41 (1979).

98. Id. at 634-35.
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bound by the regulations or required to restore the areas filled. The
appropriate sanction for the Department's failure to properly file, however, would be limited to declaring that the rules and regulations were
unenforceable as to Hirsch. If the court meant to hold the Anne Arundel regulations entirely void, then under this analysis, its holding seemingly is unjustified.99
Whatever the precise scope of the court's holding in Hirsch, the
Court of Appeals seemed to be signalling its concern with protecting
private property interests that are threatened by administrative action.
If the court was concerned primarily with landowners in Hirsch's position, its decision seems reasonable. Arguably Hirsch was injured by
the Department's failure to file properly, because any loss of a property
interest is considered injury per se.'° If, however, the court meant to
hold the rules and regulations entirely void, its concern presumably extended to all Anne Arundel County wetlands owners. Those landowners who received notice of the hearing and were afforded an
opportunity to be heard in the rulemaking process, however, had no
valid claim on the court's concern. The Department had observed all
the procedures designed to protect these landowners.''

99. The question whether this holding could be justified may depend on the nature of
the "transfer." If the state's exercise of its police powers is viewed as affecting a gratuitous
transfer, the "totally void" interpretation of Hirsch is consistent with the rule of Berman v.
Berman, 193 Md. 614, 69 A.2d 271 (1949), which held that a gratuitous unacknowledged and
unrecorded deed of land is void even as between the parties thereto. Thus, until the Department "records" its "gratuitous" transfer, the transfer would be totally void. After "recording," the rules and regulations would still be unenforceable against a subsequent purchaser,
such as Hirsch, who recorded first. This would be so even if the subsequent purchaser knew
of the rules and regulations, since until properly recorded, the rules are ineffective even
against the current landowner, who is free to transfer the property unencumbered by restrictions.
Perhaps the better view is that, since a valid exercise of the police power does not
require compensation, the lack of compensation for the transfer should not be used to impair its effect. This would be more consistent with the protective purpose of the Act. See
notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text supra.
100. See, e.g 3 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 714, at 97 (3d ed. 1939) (interference with
natural rights in land would be an injury to the owner). In discussing standing, the court
speculated on what Hirsch "may have" or "may not have" done had notice been given. 288
Md. at 114, 416 A.2d at 20. But Hirsch did not allege either that he would not have
purchased the property, or that he paid more for the property than he would have, had he
received notice.
101. Landowners at the time of the rulemaking were properly notified of the hearing, see
notes 33 to 35 and accompanying text supra, and were afforded an opportunity to be heard.
Although there were some defects in the procedures used by the Department to give the
second notice, see note 37 and accompanying text supra, such defects could easily be cured
by a subsequent notice. The defects were not directly at issue in Hirsch, although the court
noted that they might provide standing for Hirsch to sue. See note 68 supra.
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In response to the Hirsch opinion,0 2 the Maryland legislature
amended the Wetlands Act during the 1981 session."°3 The principal
modification was the addition of language declaring wetlands regulations to be valid and enforceable despite a failure to file them properly,
if the property owner had actual notice before filling or dredging wetlands. 04 The effect of a Departmental failure to comply with the Act's
filing requirement has thus been clarified by the legislature.
Other Problems in Interpretingthe Act
Other difficulties in interpreting the Wetlands Act remain. Two
arose in the Hirsch case, but the court chose not to address them directly. For instance, in a footnote the court concluded simply that the
circuit court was not clearly in error when it found that all the wetlands
at issue were private, rather than state, wetlands.'0 5 Because the validity of restrictions on state wetlands does not rest on compliance with
any rulemaking procedures,"6 the question whether wetlands are state
or private wetlands is crucial when, as in Hirsch, the restrictions on
private wetlands are invalidated by a notice or filing defect. If the standards used to determine the question in the circuit court were appropriate and proper, effective enforcement of the Act will be difficult, if not
impractical.
The circuit court concluded that the Department had failed to establish that state rather than private wetlands were filled. 107 In an attempt to identify the mean high water line, the boundary between state
102. Senate Bill 187, an emergency bill introduced by Senator McGuirk at the request of
the Department, specifically identifies the Hirsch opinion in the preamble, noting that it "left
unclear whether the provisions of Natural Resources Article, § 9-301, et seq., and regulations adopted thereunder, are enforceable against persons who may have acquired title to
properties at a time when wetlands maps and regulations pertaining to such properties were
not properly filed among the land records." Thomas Deming, Counsel to the Department,
testified in support of the bill, and the Department filed a Bill Report which identified the
Hirsch decision as the necessitating factor for the legislation. Bill Report, S.B. 187, Md.
Gen. Assembly Sess. (1981).
103. 1981 Md. Laws, ch. 102.
104. The amendment added subsection (e) to MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-501:

The provisions of this title are enforceable against any person charged with dredging or
filling private wetlands without a permit, notwithstanding a defense that pertinent wetlands maps and regulations had not been properly filed among the land records, if the
court finds that the person charged had actual notice of the applicable regulatory requirements before he dredged or filled the private wetlands. The subsection shall apply
only to dredging or filling activities occuring after July 1, 1981.
Section 9-301 was also amended to clarify the proper procedure for filing "among the land
records," as required by § 9-301(c), by adding subsection (d).
105. 288 Md. at 118-19 n.10, 416 A.2d at 22 n.10.
106. See notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text supra.

107. See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text supra.
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and private wetlands, the Department introduced testimony regarding
vegetation, tidal activity, and soil samples at the site, as well as calculations of the contour of the land under the fill.' 0 8 The court nonetheless
found the state had failed to carry its burden of proof because it had
established "neither the exact contours of the site nor the degree to
which the soil compacted."' 9 In discussing the Department's burden
of proof, the circuit court disregarded Hirsch's role in increasing the
difficulty of demonstrating the exact contours of the site before the
fill. I" If by finding the circuit court's standard not "clearly erroneous,"
the Court of Appeals in fact endorsed that standard, the department's
burden will be increased markedly whenever a wetlands violator ignores the Department's orders and acts to obscure the "exact contours"
of the land.
In Hawkins v. Alaska Freight Lines, Inc.," the Alaska Supreme
Court adopted a standard more attuned to the purpose of the Maryland
Wetlands Act. Like Hirsch, the Hawkins case turned on the location of
a mean high water line that had been obscured by a filling operation.
Holding that a surveyor's "high water meander line," which approximated the actual contours, was adequate proof even without soil borings, the Hawkins court noted that
[slince appellees, by their own actions, made it impracticable for
appellant to establish the seaward boundary of her property, it
would be unfair to place the burden on appellant to establish that
boundary in order to prove that the beach road crossed her property. In such a situation we hold that it will be presumed that the
meander line approximates the line of mean high water mark and
establishes appellant's seaward boundary, and that the burden was
upon appellees to rebut the presumption." 2
In an analogous situation, the Maryland Court of Appeals has applied a similar standard. In Hanley v. Stulman, 1 3 a property owner's
grading operation obscured all evidence of a right of way through the
property. 4 While affirming the general rule that the plaintiff carries
the burden of proving all elements relied upon to establish a proper
claim for relief, including the location of a claimed right of way, the
Court of Appeals observed that the plaintiff "was prevented from
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Equity No. 22763, slip op. at 5.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 2-5.
410 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1966).
Id. at 994.
212 Md. 273, 129 A.2d 132 (1957).
Id. at 275, 129 A.2d at 134.
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showing this 'exact' location, because the [landowner] completely obliterated its former location by bulldozing and grading operations."" 5
The court held that the lower court should have located "the roadway
. . . in such a manner as to provide the appellant and the public a
"9116
substantially equivalent road or way ...
There is Maryland precedent, therefore, for modifying the plaintiffs burden of proof when the defendant has made that burden more
difficult to satisfy. This approach appears more consistent with the
purposes of the Wetlands Act than the approach adopted by the circuit
court and ratified by the Court of Appeals in Hirsch.
The Court of Appeals did not address the question whether the
circuit court properly ignored the Department's administrative findings
of fact. l1 7 Although the Department had found in its administrative
hearing that Hirsch had filled both state and private wetlands, the trial
court did not formally consider the administrative findings;I" 8 rather, it
treated the factual issues de novo. The Act mandates de novo review. 9 In Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand &
Gravel Corp., 120 however, the Court of Appeals held such de novo judicial review unconstitutional.1 2' Though Linchester concerned a differ115. Id. at 279, 129 A.2d at 136.
116. Id. The Court of Appeals overturned the Chancellor's dismissal, which had been
based on the fact that the appellant could not,
from the evidence, place 'the complete and exact location' of the road ....
[The
Chancellor] held that even though the [landowner] had wrongfully destroyed the road,
and the appellant and the public improperly had been deprived of its use, the appellant
had not met the burden of 'establishing by his evidence the exact location, description,
width and course of the entire road.'
Id. at 276-77, 129 A.2d at 134.
Noting the ancient maxim, "Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy," the
court cited an earlier case for the proposition that
'[c]ourts of equity are not, in the dispensation of justice, subject to those strict technical
rules, which in other Courts are sometimes found in the way, and so difficult to surmount. The remedies here are moulded, so as to reach, if practicable, the real merits of
the controversy, and justice will not be suffered to be entangled in a web of
technicalities.'
Id. at 227, 129 A.2d at 134 (citation omitted).
117. The briefs submitted to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals do
not more than mention the administrative hearings and the resulting order. However,
Hirsch did characterize the "so-called informal hearing" as a "farce," Brief for Appellant,
App., at 2, apparently to justify disregarding the subsequent order.
118. See Findings of Fact and Conclusion, Administrative Hearing re: WRA Order C-075-205 (1975).
119. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-305(b).
120. 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975).
121. The Linchester court found that MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-308(b) violated the
Maryland Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. 274 Md. at 217-19, 334 A.2d at 51926. For a critical view of Linchester, see E. Tomlinson, ConstitutionalLimits on the DecisionalPowersof CourtsandAdministrativeAgencies in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REV. 414 (1976).
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ent section within the Act, 12 2 the section pertinent to Hirsch is worded
identically, 123 and the court noted in Linchester that this section likely
would be unconstitutional for the same reasons. 24 Some weight, therefore, should have been accorded to the administrative findings

below. 125
The Court of Appeals may have avoided this question purposefully, because the parties neither raised it below nor on appeal. 26 In
light of Linchester, however, it perhaps would have been appropriate
for the court to raise this issue sua sponte, if only to hold that the issue
had been waived by the failure to raise it at the trial court level. Because the court chose not to address it in Hirsch, the question whether
Linchester would have applied to this section of the Act, had it been

raised, must go unresolved.
CONCLUSION

Both the legislature and the courts will be called on to interpret
and modify the Wetlands Act to realize the Act's goal - protection of
Maryland's delicate and valuable wetlands resources. Hirsch provided
an opportunity for the Court of Appeals to interpret the Act, and its
interpretation prompted a legislative response modifying the Act. Although some questions were resolved in the process, further attention
122. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-308(b) deals with review of decisions to grant or

deny licenses to use state wetlands, whereas § 9-305(b) deals with review of decisions about
permits to useprivate wetlands, any other rule or regulations affecting private wetlands, or
designation as private wetlands.
123. Compare MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-308(b) with id. § 9-305(b).
124. 274 Md. at 229 n.6, 334 A.2d at 525 n.6.
125. It is not entirely clear what weight the administrative findings should receive:
'Whichever of the recognizing tests the court uses - [whether it be the arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or illegal standard, or the tests of] substantially of the evidence on
the record as a whole, clearly erroneous, fairly debatable or against the weight or preponderance of the evidence on the entire record -

its appraisal

. . .

must be of the

agency's factfinding results and not an independent original estimate of or decision on
the evidence . . . There are differences [among the tests] but they are slight and under
any of the standards the judicial review essentially should be limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.
Id. at 225, 334 A.2d at 523, (quoting Insurance Comm'r v. National Bureau, 248 Md. 292,
236 A.2d 282 (1966).
126. See note 117 supra. In an informal interview, Judge Eldridge recalled that the
Linchester question was posed from the bench during oral argument before the Court of
Appeals. Both parties maintained that the issue was not raised by the case, since the informal administrative hearing did not meet the requirements of MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 9-304. Interview with Judge John C. Eldridge of the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Annapolis, Maryland (June 9, 1981). This would explain why the court did not have to address
or decide the issue.

1981]

HIRSCH V. MARYLAND DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES

155

will be necessary to provide guidance in answering the questions left
unresolved by Hirsch.

SHOULD PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS ANCHOR THE
NAVIGATION SERVITUDEKaiser-Aetna v. United States
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,' the Supreme Court held that
unless the federal government paid just compensation, it could not
open to public access a private marina that the lessee, Kaiser Aetna,
had rendered navigable-in-fact.2 KaiserAetna represents a rare setback
in governmental attempts to invoke the navigation servitude to avoid
compensating riparian landowners whose property has been adversely
affected by federal action in navigable waters.
The federal government enjoys a navigation servitude in the navigable waters of the United States.3 Because of this servitude, a riparian
landowner generally must bear the consequences of federal projects to
improve navigation on water bordering his land.4 In contrast, the owner of land bound property sometimes is entitled to compensation under
the fifth amendment5 when government action decreases the value of
1. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
2. Id at 180. Traditionally, only waters "susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted
in the customary modes" were regarded as navigable-in-fact. Id
3. See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897). The doctrine is also referred to as
the "navigational servitude," see, e.g., Comment, NavigationalServitude as a Method of EcologicalProtection, 75 DICK. L. REV. 256 (1970), the "dominant servitude," see, e.g., Power,
The Fox in the Chicken Coop." The Regulatory Programof the U.S Army Corps of Engineers,
63 VA. L. REV. 503, 541 (1977); FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249
(1954), the "superior navigational easement," see, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam
Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960), and the "easement of navigation," see, e.g., United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 228 (1956). The term "servitude" has been
invoked by some who postulate the government has a "privilege," but not a property interest, in navigable'waters. Compare Note, Power Site Value in Eminent Domain Proceedings:
.4 New Toll Chargefor Watei Resources Development, 65 YALE L.J. 96 n.5 (1955) with
Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation - Strugglefor a Doctrine, 48 OR.
L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1968).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945); Greenleaf Lumber
Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be ... deprived
of life, liberty, oryroperty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." The compensation clause of the fifth amendment does not appfy directly to the States. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,
250-51 (1833). The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, incorporates
the fifth amendment's compensation clause and requires that the owners of property taken
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his property.6 In such cases, the government is considered to have
taken something from the landowner. When land bound property is
involved, the question is whether the government action should
be
7
viewed as a taking or as a valid exercise of the police power.
When the government is entitled to exercise its navigation servitude, however, there is no question of a fifth amendment taking, for the
federal government has a dominant property-like interest in navigable
waters. This interest flows from the federal government's power to regulate commerce, 8 and when the federal government acts to aid navigation, the government's interest supersedes most private property
interests. Thus when riparian land is affected by federal action in a
navigable waterway, the question is whether the government can invoke the navigation servitude. Before Kaiser Aetna, the courts recognized only one limitation on the federal government's power to exercise
the navigation servitude. If federal navigation projects involved physical invasion of private land above the mean high water mark, the riparian owner was entitled to compensation under the fifth amendment. 9
Because Kaiser Aetna suggested that there might be other circumstances in which the navigation servitude would not apply, one might
view the decision as evidence of a fundamental change in the court's
view of the proper balance between the variant interests served by the
commerce clause and the fifth amendment.'0 Yet from one perspective,
KaiserAetna marks nothing more than a refusal to extend the navigation servitude beyond its traditional application in the context of federal public works projects.
II.

HISTORY

The concept of the navigation servitude evolved from Chief Jusfor public use by the States be compensated. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897).

6. Cf. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (overflights that destroyed the
use of land for residential purposes held to be a taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946) (overflights that destroyed the use of land as a chicken farm held a taking); Ports-

mouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (government military installation firing
guns over private land held a taking).
7. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928); Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S.
365, 387-88 (1926). See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
123-28 (1978).
8. See text accompanying notes II to 13 infra.
9. 444 U.S. at 172-178.
10. Note, however, that Justice Rehnquist stated: "[This Court has never held that the
navigation servitude creates a blanket exception to the Takings Clause whenever Congress

exercises its Commerce Clause authority to promote navigation." ld at 172.
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tice Marshall's landmark opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden." In Gibbons
the Court held that commerce comprehends navigation 2 and that
under the commerce clause, Congress may exercise regulatory control
over the nation's navigable waters.' 3 Chief Justice Marshall thus laid
the foundation for the navigation servitude.
In Gibson v. United States" the Court introduced the theory that
the federal government possesses a dominant interest in navigable interstate waters' and began to develop the accompanying "no compensation rule."' 6 In Gibson, a riparian landowner sought compensation
from the United States because a federal project to improve navigation
on the Ohio River had deprived her of access to the river.' 7 The Court
concluded that the damage "was not the result of a taking of appellant's property, and was merely incidental to the exercise of a servitude
to which her property had always been subject."' 8
On numerous occasions since the late nineteenth century the Court
has held that, despite the fifth amendment, riparian landowners may be
denied compensation for damages from federal actions to further navi11. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
12. Id at 193.
13. Id at 192-93.
14. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
15. Id at 276.
16. Id This rule also has been referred to as the "rule of governmental non-liability."
See, e.g., United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386, 391 (1945).
17. Petitioner raised fruit on a farm located on an island in the Ohio River and shipped
her products upriver to markets in Pittsburgh and Allegheny, Pennsylvania. She had 1000
feet of frontage on the river, but only one landing could be used for shipping produce and
receiving supplies. When the federal government constructed a dike to improve the flow of
the water in the main channel of the river, the depth of the water along petitioner's property
was lowered, thereby preventing free access to the landing during seven months of the year.
166 U.S. at 269-71 (1897).
18. Id at 276. The Court noted that the dike was not upon petitioner's land, nor did it
cause the waters of the Ohio River to inundate any of her property. Id at 271.
Since the Court did not view the riparian landowner's loss of access to navigable
waters as a taking and there was no physical invasion of the land, the Court denied her
claim for compensation. The value of the petitioner's property, however, did plummet an
estimated one hundred and fifty to two hundred dollars per acre as a result of the dike's
construction. Id at 270.
The Court reaffirmed this view four years later in Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141
(1900). In Scranton a riparian landowner sought compensation when construction of a pier
by the federal government blocked his access to a navigable river. The pier rested on submierged rather than fast land and was constructed to improve navigation. Id at 153. Because construction of the pier was viewed as consonant with the Government's dominant
interest in navigation, the Court concluded that compensation was not required for the ensuing loss of access suffered by the riparian landowner. Id at 164-65. See also United States
v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945) (Government not required to compensate when
deposits of dredged materials blocked a riparian landowner's access to navigable waters).
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gation.19 For example, the Court has denied compensation to plaintiffs
asserting an interest in oyster beds20 and to owners of structures erected
in navigable waterways,2 all damaged or destroyed by federal water
projects. Additionally, in cases where federal projects resulted in actual physical invasion of riparian landowners' property, as a general
rule, the Court recognized their fifth amendment claims only for damages caused by inundation above the high-water mark.2 2
In United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.2 3 the Court first confronted the issue whether the fifth amendment entitles a riparian landowner to compensation when the government interferes with his
interest in the flow of a navigable waterway. In Chandler-Dunbarthe
defendant, a riparian landowner, argued that the appropriation of his
property by the federal government entitled him to compensation
under the fifth amendment and that the compensation ought to include
the value of the water's potential to supply power in excess of navigational needs.2 4 The Court reasoned that because of the government's
navigation servitude, the locational value of defendant's property that
was attributable to the water power inherent in the stream's flow was
not value which he could claim as a private property owner.2 5 In the
words of Justice Lurton, the "[o]wnership of a private stream wholly
upon the lands of an individual is conceivable; but that the running
water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is
inconceivable. 2 6
The Court has refused to retreat from its position in Chandler-Dunbar.27 Years later, the Court decided a similar valuation issue in
19. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Twin City
Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
20. See, e.g., Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913) (Government

dredging to improve navigation in a bay, the bed of which was used for oyster cultivation,
did not constitute a fifth amendment taking of the property of the lessee in the oyster beds).
21. See, e.g., Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915) (partial removal of

a wharf compelled by widening of a harbor); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S.
364 (1907) (removal of a bridge to prevent the obstruction of navigation).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941);
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). See also Harnsberger, Eminent Domain and
Water Law, 48 NEB. L. REV. 325, 403-04 (1969).
23. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
24. Id at 61. The defendant had, pursuant to federal permit, constructed a power facility on the St. Mary's River rapids in Michigan and was selling electricity. Subsequently, the
government diverted the flow of the river for use in canals that had been constructed to
avoid its rapids, thus facilitating commerce on the Great Lakes.
25. Id. at 76.
26. Id at 69.
27. See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 228 (1956); United States v.
Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424 (1940).
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United States v. Twin City Power Co.2 8 The riparian landowner in Twin
City sought to recover, as an element of just compensation, the value of
fast land as a site for hydroelectric power operations.29 A sharply divided Court refused to award that amount to the power company.3 0
Citing Chandler-Dunbaras controlling, the Court stated that what the
power company actually sought was "a value in theflow of the stream, a
value that inheres in the Government's servitude and one that under
our decisions the Government can grant or withhold as it chooses."' '
The Twin City decision kindled considerable comment, question32
ing the Court's expansive interpretation of the navigation servitude.
Nevertheless, in United States v. Virginia Electric Co. ,3 where valuation was once again an issue, the Court adhered to the rule of Twin
City.3 4 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that the lower
court was "clearly right in excluding all value attributable to the riparian location of the land."3 5 Finally, in United States v. Rands3 6 the
Court held that claims for the enhanced value of riparian land as a port
site are not assertable against the superior rights of the United States.37
The Court said that economic advantages stemming from riparian location "are not property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
38
and need not be paid for when appropriated by the United States."
Thus, since the nineteenth century the case law concerning the
28. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).

29. The Twin City Power Co. originally was formed to acquire the land in question as a
site for a hydroelectric power project, but the acquisition of the site by the federal government for use in a massive water project thwarted the company's plans. Id at 229 (Burton, J.,
dissenting).
30. Id at 227-28. Justice Douglas reasoned that no distinction could be drawn between

asserting a claim of ownership in the flow of a river and seeking compensation for the locational value of fast land, which includes its value for riparian purposes. Id at 225-26.
31. Id at 225 (emphasis in original).
32. See, e.g., Comment, Condemnation of Riparian Lands Under the Commerce Power,
55 MIcH. L. REV. 272 (1956); Comment, Just CompensationandNavigationPower, 31 WASH.
L. REV. & ST. B.J. 271 (1956). See also Note, Power Site Value in Eminent Domain Proceedings." A New Toll Changefor Water Resource Development, 65 YALE L.J. 96 (1955) (critique
of the Court of Appeals' decision in Twin City).
33. 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
34. Id at 631-32. Just compensation for condemnation of a flowage easement over fast
land must be calculated exclusive of any value attributable to the flow of a stream.
35. Id at 631.
36. 389 U.S. 121 (1967). The State of Oregon, which had an option to purchase the

petitioner's land, had planned to use the property as an industrial park, a portion of which
would be a port. The award at the trial court was approximately one-fifth of the asserted
value of the land as a port site. 1d at 121-22.

37. Id at 126. Cf.United States v. Twin City Power Co. (no compensation for decrease
in value of fast land), 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386

(1945) (no compensation for decrease in value from improvement of navigation project).
38. 389 U.S. at 126.
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navigation servitude has been rooted in an extremely broad interpretation of federal power. Kaiser Aetna indicates, however, that federal
power to invoke the navigation servitude is limited.39
III.

THE KAISER

A.

4ETNAI DECISION

The Facts

Kuapa Pond, in its natural state, was a shallow 523 acre body of
water adjacent to Maunalua Bay4" on the Island of Oahu in Hawaii.
The Hawaiians used it only as a fishpond."' However, in 1961 the
Bishop Estate leased the development rights to a 6000 acre tract of
land, including Kuapa Pond, to Kaiser Aetna. 2 Pursuant to the terms
of that agreement and upon notice to the Corps of Engineers," 3 Kaiser
Aetna dredged Kuapa Pond to create a private marina." Following
construction of the marina, Kaiser Aetna chose to exclude all but one
commercial vessel, which was operated primarily as a means
of show4 5
ing the marina to prospective purchasers of marina lots.

In 1972 the Corps of Engineers announced that it considered
Kuapa Pond to be a navigable waterway, signifying that no further improvements could be commenced without Corps approval.4 6 Kaiser
Aetna acquiesced in part by applying for a Corps permit, but the com39. It is worth noting that the Court recently has taken a rather conservative view of the
scope of federal power in other contexts as well. See, e.g., National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that principles of federalism limit congressional authority to regulate commerce).
40. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 166.
41. Id A barrier beach, which separated Kuapa Pond from the Maunalua Bay, acted as
only a partial barrier to seawater. As a result, Kuapa Pond has always been subject to the
ebb and flow of the tides. The Hawaiians, who fished the pond, used the tides by constructing sluice gates, which permitted the natural flow of seawater in and out of the pond to flush
and enrich the water, but at the same time, prevented large fish from escaping.
42. d. at 167. The title to fishponds passed in the same manner as title to fast land
according to the culture of nineteenth century Hawaii. Title to Kuapa Pond passed to Bernice Pauahai Bishop and, thereby, to the defendant Estate. Id at 166-67. Fishponds, such
as the original Kuapa Pond, are considered private property under Hawaiian' law. Application of Kamakana, 58 Hawaii 632, 574 P.2d 1346 (1978).
43. 444 U.S. at 167. The Corps advised that no permit would be required for the proposed improvements. Id
44. Id. at 167-68. Dredging of Kuapa Pond by Kaiser Aetna increased the average
depth from two to six feet, including an eight foot main channel. Id at 167.
45. Id. at 168. Over six hundred pleasure boats enjoyed the privilege of operating
within the newly constructed marina and used its fueling and mooring facilities. United
States v. Kaiser Aetna, 584 F.2d 378, 381 (9th Cir. 1978), rey'd, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
46. 444 U.S. at 168. Authority to issue permits for such activities is vested in the Corps
of Engineers pursuant to section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. § 403 (1976).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 41

pany refused to concede the navigability of Kuapa Pond. 47 Subsequently, the United States brought suit on behalf of the Corps of
Engineers against Kaiser Aetna and the Bishop Estate. 48 The Government sought a declaration that the waters of Kuapa Pond, by then
known as the Hawaii Kai Marina, were navigable waters of the United
States and an order directing Kaiser Aetna to obtain a permit from the
Corps prior to any future construction, excavation, or filling of the marina.' 9 In addition, the Government requested an injunction to prevent
Kaiser Aetna from denying the public access to the marina and to require that public notice be given of its accessibility.5"
The district court held that the waters of the marina were navigable for the purpose of defining the scope of federal regulatory powers. 5'
But the court held that the Government could not force Kaiser Aetna
to open the marina to the public without paying just compensation because the navigation servitude did not extend to a privately constructed
52
waterway.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court on the issue of navigability and regulatory power.5 3 The two
courts, however, differed on the issue of public access. The court of
appeals noted that "[i]t is the public right of navigational use that renders regulatory control necessary in the public interest."'5 4 Therefore,
the court concluded that because the marina was a navigable waterway,
it was subject to the federal government's navigation servitude, which
guaranteed the public a right of access without any need for
55
compensation.

47. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 45 (D. Hawaii 1976), rev'd, 444 U.S.

164 (1979).
48. 444 U.S. at 168-69.
49. Id at 168.

50. Id

Kaiser Aetna, on the other hand, argued that the pond, in its improved state,

was not within the navigable waters of the United States. It asserted that because the Corps

acquiesced to the dredging prior to 1972, the Government was estopped from securing the
relief it sought in its complaint. Finally, Kaiser Aetna argued that a declaration opening the
marina to public access was a taking of private property for public use, for which the Government was compelled to pay just compensation under the fifth amendment. 408 F. Supp.
at 45.
51. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. at 45.
52. The district court explicitly rejected Kaiser Aetna's estoppel argument. Id at 54-55.

53. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 584 F.2d at 381.
54. Id
55. Id

1981]

KAISER AETNA V. U.S.

B.

Decision of the Supreme Court

A divided Supreme Court5 6 reversed the court of appeals on the
compensation issue. Speaking for the majority in KaiserAetna, Justice
Rehnquist noted that, contrary to the Government's assertions," the
definition of navigability may vary according to the context in which it
is used.58 Justice Rehnquist then implied that navigability is more
broadly defined in a regulatory setting than in the context of the navigation servitude.5 9 Ultimately, this distinction allowed the Court to
conclude that the question whether the Government may exercise its
regulatory power to provide for public access to the Hawaii-Kai Marina' is totally separate from the issue whether such an exercise of
power would amount to a "taking" requiring just compensation.
The Court began its discussion of the compensation issue by noting that fifth amendment questions generally have been resolved by an
adhoc factual inquiry. 6 ' The majority recognized that the navigation
servitude frequently has nullified the requirement of just compensation
where taking questions have concerned the public right to navigate interstate waterways.6" Justice Rehnquist stated: "The navigational servitude, which exists by virtue of the Commerce Clause in navigable
streams, gives rise to an authority in the Government to assure that
such streams retain their capacity to serve as continuous highways for
56. Justice Rehnquist wrote for a six to three majority. Justice Blackmun was joined in
dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
57. See 444 U.S. at 170 (outlining the government's position).
58. Id at 170-72.
59. Id at 170-73. Regulatory powers certainly are broader than the scope of the navigation servitude since federal regulatory authority is asserted over waterways for a variety of
purposes other than safeguarding navigation. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426-27 (1940). As the Court noted, "congressional authority over the
waters of this Nation does not depend on a stream's 'navigability.'" 444 U.S. at 174. This
alone, however, does not support a finding that navigability is more broadly defined in a
regulatory setting than when the term is used to ascertain the scope of the "no compensation" rule of the navigation servitude.
60. 444 U.S. at 174. The Court indicated that Congress clearly had the power to guarantee the public free access to the marina. Id
61. Id at 174-75. Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court generally has "been unable to
develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). See also Michelman, Property, Utility andFairness. Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1165 (1967). Michelman postulates that judicial efforts to formulate decisional rules have
not provided satisfactory means for the resolution of compensation issues. According to
Michelman, "the only 'test' for compensability that is 'correct' in the sense of being directly
responsive to society's purpose in engaging in a compensation practice is the test of fairness
. Id at 1171-72.
62. 444 U.S. at 175.
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' 63

Thus the Court

emphasized that the rationale for the navigation servitude was to safe64
guard the public interest in unencumbered waterborne commerce.
The Court reviewed the existing case law, but found none of its
dispositive of the issues in KaiserAetna. 65 Justice Rehnquist then engaged in an ad hoc factual inquiry,66 concluding that the navigation
servitude was inapplicable and that the Government would have to exercise its power of eminent domain to assure public access to the marina.6 7 Several factors mentioned by the Court seemed to control its
decision to require compensation. First, in its natural state Kuapa
Pond was incapable of supporting navigation for the purpose of interstate commerce. 6618 Second, the majority emphasized that the pond had
been considered private property under traditional Hawaiian law.6 9
The Court noted that the Corps of Engineers had expressly consented
to the improvements to Kuapa Pond without requiring a permit and
that the pond was rendered navigable solely through Kaiser Aetna's
efforts.7" Finally, the Court seemed to attach significance to the suggestion that imposition of the navigation servitude would lead to physical
invasion of what it considered to be a privately-owned marina. 7 '
C. Analysis of the Kaiser Aetna Decision

In holding that the navigation servitude did not apply to the marina in Kaiser Aetna, the Court appeared to raise doubts concerning
several previously well-settled matters. First, the Court's conclusion
that the Government must exercise its eminent domain power and pay
compensation rests on the assumption that securing public access to the
Hawaii Kai Marina would constitute a "taking" of some "property"
interest held by Kaiser Aetna.72 But the Court repeatedly has held that
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id at 177.
Id at 175.
Id at 175-78.
See note 61 and accompanying text supra.

67. 444 U.S. at 176-80.
68. Id at 178-79. Since Kuapa Pond had a maximum depth of only two feet prior to the
dredging operations of Kaiser Aetna, the Court did not view it as comparable to the kinds of

waterways which it had previously subjected to the navigation servitude. fd
69. See note 42 supra. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun attacked the notion that state

law has any significance in determining the scope of the navigation servitude. He argued,
instead, that "state-created interests in the waters or beds of such navigable water are secondary" to the navigation servitude. 444 U.S. at 191-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also
Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).

70. 444 U.S. at 179.
71. Id at 180.
72. Justice Rehnquist apparently felt that the characterization of the right to exclude

others as a "property" interest was somewhat self-evident. 444 U.S. at 176. No Supreme

19811

KAISER AETNA V. U.S.

there can be no "property" interest in any of the navigable waters of
the United States.73 It would seem, therefore, that there can also be no
"taking" of an asserted private interest in a navigable waterway. Nevertheless, despite the marina's navigability following the improvements
by Kaiser Aetna,7 4 the Court concluded that requiring public access
would, indeed, be a "taking."7 5
The apparent contradiction is, however, illusory. Prior to Kaiser

Aetna's improvements, Kuapa Pond was incapable of supporting navigation for the purpose of interstate commerce. 76 No prior cases dealing
with the navigation servitude concerned a waterway that had been
made navigable by the efforts of a private party.77 Because Kaiser

Aetna had made the marina navigable, it was reasonable for Kaiser
Aetna to assume that this waterway was private property. In addition,
Kuapa Pond traditionally had been considered private property under
Hawaiian law7 8 and was far less substantial than the waterways generally associated with the navigation servitude.7 9 Therefore, the majority
Court decisions were cited in support of the right to exclude. See 444 U.S. at 180 n. I1.
However, the theory of trespass law suggests that the right to exclude is historically accepted
as an incident of private ownership of real property. A number of states have both criminal
penalties, see, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 577 (1975), and civil remedies for trespassory
violations, see, e.g., Brazerol v. Hudson, 262 Md. 269, 273, 277 A.2d 585, 587 (1971); Gusdorff v. Duncan, 94 Md. 160, 169, 50 A. 574, 576 (1901).
73. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125; United States
v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229
U.S. 53 (1913).
74. 444 U.S. at 171. The Court was willing to state only that"Kuapa Pond may fit
within definitions of 'navigability' articulated in past decisions of this Court." Id There
can be little doubt, however, that under the Court's traditional definition of navigability,
Kuapa Pond, as improved by Kaiser Aetna, was navigable. See United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407; The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
75. 444 U.S. at 178.
76. Id. Prior case law established three disparate tests of navigability: "navigability in
fact," "navigable capacity," and "ebb and flow" of the tide. Id at 181-84 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). See also The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870); Propeller Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454-55 (1851). Based on the third and oldest test,
a product of the English common law, Justice Blackmun reasoned that Kuapa Pond always
had been a navigable waterway because, in its natural state, it had been subject to the ebb
and flow of the tides.
For a thorough treatment of the historical development of the "navigability" concept, see MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law.- HistoricalDevelopment, CurrentImportance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 510 (1975). The refusal of the Court to adopt Justice Blackmun's position casts further
doubt on the possibility that "ebb and flow" will again be considered a viable test for navigability. See also Bartke, supra note 3, at 6-9.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S.
141 (1900).
78. See note 42 supra.
79. See 444 U.S. at 178-79.
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seemingly was justified in concluding that Kaiser Aetna's assumption
that it possessed a property interest in the newly created marina was
both reasonable and sufficiently important to be compensable.8 0 Unfortunately, the majority opinion failed to define clearly the exact nature and scope of the property interest recognized in Kaiser Aetna."'
D.

Kaiser Aetna and the Future of the Navigation Servitude

It is possible to view Kaiser Aetna as an initial step in a general
retreat from the historically broad application of the navigation servitude. Undoubtedly there will be some lower courts that will sieze upon
this opportunity to begin dismantling the doctrine. To do so, however,
would be to read far too much into the Court's language in Kaiser
Aetna.
There are at least two reasons to view Kaiser Aetna narrowly.
First, Justice Rehnquist clearly recognized the Government's authority
to invoke the navigation servitude under proper circumstances. 82 Second, the majority conscientiously avoided giving the impression that it
was modifying or overruling well-settled principles in this area.8 3 Indeed, the thrust of the majority opinion was4 to distinguish the facts of
8
Kaiser Aetna from those of previous cases.
It also is worth noting that the Court might have, but did not, hold
that the navigation servitude does not extend to waters rendered navigable solely through the efforts of private actors. This narrow holding
would undoubtedly have limited conflicting interpretations of Kaiser
Aetna by lower courts without overruling established precedent. Additionally, the predictability inherent in such a rule could have eliminated the title concerns of some riparian landowners. 85 This rule,
however, would be undesirable. It would unnecessarily restrict the
80. See 444 U.S. at 179. But see Morreale, FederalPowerin Western Waters: Navigation
Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 23-25 (1965). See also
United States v. Kansas City Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950) (acknowledging that riparian
landowners are assumed to be on notice that their land is burdened by the navigation
servitude).
81. A related issue is the scope of the navigation servitude under the Court's analysis in
KaiserAetna. In his dissent Justice Blackmun maintained that the navigation servitude extends to all navigable waters of the United States. 444 U.S. at 184-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He saw the matter as governed by broadly defined precedent rather than by the
exception carved out by the majority. Id at 186. The scope of the majority's exception to
the traditionally broad application of the servitude remains unclear.
82. 444 U.S. at 175-76.
83. Id at 175-79.
84. See notes 76 to 79 and accompanying text supra.
85. See generallyl Morris, The FederalNavigation Servitude.- Impediment to the Development of the Waterfront, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 189 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94
HARV. L. REV. 75, 214 (1980).
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power of the federal government to exercise its dominant servitude in
the event that a small watercourse rendered navigable by some private
entity fell within the scope of an important federal water project.86
Although the Court did not identify the rationale for its decision,
the Kaiser Aetna decision can be justified in terms of the underlying
purpose of the navigation servitude. The doctrine was developed to
enable the federal government to minimize the cost of exercising its
power of eminent domain when engaging in public works in navigable
waterways. The navigation servitude, therefore, has been invoked

principally in the context of federal public works projects, 87 not in the
context of regulating private actions. The result in KaiserAetna could
thus be justified as a restriction of the servitude's "no compensation"
rule to its traditional area of application - federal public works

projects in navigable waterways.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The navigation servitude has been the subject of increasing criticism from legal commentators in recent years.88 Arguably, both the
Executive and the Congress have the power to blunt some of the most
severe criticism of the doctrine. The Court has indicated that the gov86. Consider a situation in which the federal government embarks upon a major federal
water project that requires the condemnation of several large tracts of riparian land. A rule
exempting waters rendered navigable by private actors from the coverage of the navigation
servitude would permit a riparian landowner who had rendered certain waters along his
property navigable to receive compensation for the value of some proprietary interest in
those waters based upon KaiserAetna. A second riparian landowner who invested substantial funds developing an already navigable waterfront would not receive any compensation
for his interest in the waters. This anomalous situation quickly would prove to be unworkable. 444 U.S. at 180.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967) (lock and dam project authorized by Congress); United States v. Virginia Elec. Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961) (congressionally
authorized construction of dam and reservoir); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350
U.S. 222 (1956) (federal project for the improvement of the Savannah River basin); United
States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) (construction of a dam by the federal government to raise the water level of a river); United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386
(1945) (dredging operation by the federal government); United States v. Chicago, M., St. P.
& Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941) (construction of a dam by the federal government to raise
the water level of a river); Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915) (partial
removal of a wharf by federal government to widen a harbor); Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co.
v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913) (Congressionally authorized dredging of a bay to improve
navigation); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) (federal construction
of canals to facilitate commerce on the Great Lakes); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204
U.S. 364 (1907) (removal of a bridge by federal government to prevent the obstruction of
navigation); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) (construction of a pier by federal
government to improve navigation); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1896) (construction of a dike by the federal government to improve flow of river in main channel).
88. See, e.g., Morreale, supra note 80, at 76-77; Morris, supra note 85.
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ernment has the option, but no duty, to deny fifth amendment claims
when the "no compensation" rule of the servitude is available.8 9 Additionally, statutory restriction of the "no compensation" rule would mitigate some of the harshness of the doctrine and spread the cost of
federal navigation projects more evenly among those who ultimately
enjoy the benefits of these projects.9" The Kaiser Aetna decision could
serve as the basis of another, fundamentally more sound approach to
the navigation servitude. In short, restricting the "no compensation"
rule to cases involving federal public works projects in navigable waterways would provide a concrete basis for making future decisions, be
responsive to the original purpose of the doctrine, and yet require the
government to compensate a riparian landowner if it interferes with his
property for some other purpose.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 724, 739 (1950); Coastal
Petroleum Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1206, 1210 (1975), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 567
(1980).
90. See Morris, supra note 85, at 195-98.

In Re Randoif T. and In Re Bobby C. - THE STANDARD OF
PROOF IN A JUVENILE WAIVER HEARING AND
THE PROBLEM OF UNREPORTED
OPINIONS
The Maryland Court of Appeals has granted certiorari in two juvenile cases decided last term by the Court of Special Appeals, In re
Randolf T' and In re Bobby C.2 In both cases, the Court of Special
Appeals held that the preponderance standard satisfies due process re-

quirements in the context of juvenile waiver hearings.' Although these
decisions are not inconsistent with any United States Supreme Court
holding, they are inconsistent with the principles that guided the
Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Kent,4 In re Gault,5 In re Winshi7, 6
and Addington v. Texas.7 Furthermore, unless overturned by the Court
of Appeals, Randof T and Bobby C. will subvert the juvenile justice

system's principle goal - the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents.
Maryland law provides that a juvenile court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction over an allegedly delinquent child 8 if the child is at
1. No. 645 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 17, 1981), cert. granted, No. 25 (Md. May 27,
1981).
2. 48 Md. App. 249, 426 A.2d 435, cert. granted, No. 47 (Md. July 2, 1981).
3. Id. at 254, 426 A.2d at 439; No. 645, slip op. at 6.
4. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
5. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
6. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
7. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
8. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(d) (1980) defines child as a person
under 18 years of age. The juvenile court has "exclusive original jurisdiction over a child
alleged to be delinquent, in need of supervision, or in need of assistance." Id. § 3-804(a).
The Code further provides, however, that the court does not have jurisdiction over:
(i) A child 14 years old or older alleged to have done an act which, if committed by
an adult, would be a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, as well as all
other charges against the child arising out of the same incident, unless an order removing the proceeding to the court has been filed pursuant to § 594A of Article 27;
(2) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have done an act in violation of any provision of the Transportation Article or other traffic law or ordinance except an act that
prescribes a penalty of incarceration;
(3) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have done an act in violation of any provision of law, rule, or regulation governing the use or operation of a boat except an act
that prescribes a penalty of incarceration;
(4) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have committed the crime of robbery with
a deadly weapon or attempted robbery with a deadly weapon as well as all other
charges against the child arising out of the same incident, unless an order removing the
proceeding to the court has been filed pursuant to § 594A of Article 27.
Id. at § 3-804(d).
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least fifteen years old or is charged with a sufficiently serious crime.9
Before waiving jurisdiction to the adult criminal court, the juvenile
court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is an
"unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures."' 0
Randolf T. and Bobby C. were both older than fifteen when they
allegedly committed delinquent acts.' 1 Accordingly, they were candidates for waiver. A juvenile court waived jurisdiction over each of the
boys after determining that he was not amenable to rehabilitative treatment as a juvenile.' 2 Each appealed his waiver, arguing that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment mandates that the waiver
13
decision be controlled by the standard of clear and convincing proof.
An understanding of the social and constitutional principles that inform the juvenile justice system is important to any analysis of the issue
presented by Randoif T and Bobby C.
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

The fundamental premise of the juvenile justice system is that children should be protected from the trauma and stigma of criminal convictions.' 4 Unlike the adult criminal justice system, which focuses on
punishing guilty defendants,15 the juvenile system regards the state as a
benevolent paternal figure dispensing rehabilitative care to correct the
antisocial tendencies of its children.' 6
9. Id. § 3-804(a). The Code provides:
(a) The court may waive the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by § 3-804 with respect
to a petition alleging delinquency by:
(1) A child who is 15 years old or older, or
(2) A child who has not reached his 15th birthday, but who is charged with
committing an act which if committed by an adult, would be punishable by death or life
imprisonment.
10. Id. § 3-804(c).
11. 48 Md. App. at 250, 426 A.2d at 437; No. 645, slip op. at 2.

Randolf was alleged to be a juvenile delinquent because of his arrest for possessing
and discharging an unregistered short-barreled shotgun. Id. At the time of his waiver hearing, he was awaiting trial in adult criminal court for an unrelated homicide charge. Id. at 3.
Although Randolf had no prior juvenile or criminal record, the nature of his alleged offenses

and the pending homicide charge prompted the state to seek waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.
Id.
Bobby was alleged to be a juvenile delinquent based on charges of two attempted
murders, assault, and illegal use of a handgun. 48 Md. App. at 250, 426 A.2d at 437.
12. 48 Md. App. at 251, 426 A.2d at 437; No. 645, slip op. at 3.
13. 48 Md. App. at 250, 426 A.2d at 436; No. 645, slip op. at 1.
14. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909).
15. Id. at 106.
16. The concept of the state as the ultimate protector was derived from the doctrine that

viewed the state asparenspatriae.In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967), the Supreme Court
noted that "[t]he Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize
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In keeping with the rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice, juvenile
proceedings are conducted in an informal fashion.' 7 The underlying
notion is that the judge, the state, and the accused delinquent share the
same goal - to serve the best interests of the child.'I Accordingly, or
so the theory goes, the juvenile does not require the same protections
that we afford adults in an adversarial criminal trial. 19 Moreover, juvenile proceedings are civil, not criminal, and thus the juvenile cannot
automatically claim the constitutional rights guaranteed a criminal
defendant.2"
Since 1966, however, the United States Supreme Court has been
receptive to claims that juveniles are entitled to certain due process protections in juvenile proceedings. In Kent, for example, the Court held
that, under the District of Columbia waiver statute, the juvenile court's
decision to waive jurisdiction over Kent was invalid.2 ' The waiver decision could not stand because the judge held no hearing, gave no statement of reasons for his decision, and denied the juvenile access to the
social and probation reports that the judge presumably considered.22
Several times the Court referred to the waiver hearing as "critically
important,12 3 and its importance apparently dictated that the juvenile
be protected from an arbitrary decision.24
Although the Court stressed that its decision was based on the District of Columbia statute,25 it also indicated that its interpretation of the
statute was affected by constitutional considerations. The Court said,
"[Tihere is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences without ceremony ....
"26 Furthermore,
one year later in Gault, the Court referred to the Kent case, saying,
"Although our decision turned upon the language of the statute, we
emphasized the necessity that 'the basic requirements of due process
the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its
historic credentials are of dubious relevance."
17. See id.at 25-26.
18. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 at 554-55. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at
16.
19, See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 555.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 543. Morris Kent was a minor who had confessed to the commission of numerous housebreakings, robberies, and rapes. Id. at 544. Although Kent was subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court, the juvenile court waived
its jurisdiction so that Kent could be criminally prosecuted. Id. at 546.
22. Id.
23. Eg., id. at 556, 560.
24. Id. at 555.
25. Id. at 556.
26. Id. at 554.
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and fairness' be satisfied in such proceedings. 27
In both Gault 28 and Winsh6029 the Court held that specific due process rights attach to juvenile adjudicatory proceedings. Under these
decisions, the juvenile accused in an adjudicatory hearing has constitutional rights to be represented by counsel, 30 to receive notice of
charges, 3 1 to avoid self-incrimination, 32 to confront and cross-examine
witnesses,33 and to be proved delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt.34
Although Kent, Gault, and Winshio established that juveniles have
due process rights that the juvenile system must respect, none of these
decisions dealt with the question whether the Constitution mandates
any particular standard of proof in a juvenile waiver hearing. In the
absence of any Supreme Court decision of this question, the state
courts have upheld an assortment of standards for the waiver decision.
For example, the Indiana Court of Appeals 35 and the Illinois Supreme
36
Court
have upheld statutes that allow waiver if waiver will best serve
the interests of the child and the state. The Court of Criminal Appeals
of Oklahoma determined that the judge must base his waiver decision
on "substantial evidence" - defined as more than a scintilla.3 7 An
Ohio court upheld a statute requiring "reasonable grounds" for
transfer.3 8
Other jurisdictions have required more stringent checks on the
judge's discretion. For example, the Massachusetts waiver statute declares that a judge must grant waiver based on clear and convincing
evidence.39 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts noted that the statute
provided "extra measures of evidentiary protection" in keeping with
the language in Kent emphasizing the seriousness of the waiver process.4" No jurisdiction, however, has critically examined the function
of a standard of proof in the context of the waiver process. As the
27. 387 U.S. at 12.

28. Id. at 30.
29. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).

30. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
31. Id. at 33.
32. Id. at 55.
33. Id. at 57.
34. United States v. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
35. Clemens v. State, 162 Ind. App. 50, 53-54, 317 N.E.2d 859, 862-63, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 859 (1974).
36. People v. Taylor, 76 ll.2d 289, 302-04, 391 N.E.2d 366, 372 (1979).
37. In re J.W.N., 620 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
38. State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St. 2d i, 6, 298 N.E.2d 568, 572 (1973).
39. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61 (Supp. 1981 West).
40. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 80 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1565, 1572, 409 N.E.2d
197, 202 (1980).
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appellants argued in Randolf T and Bobby C, the recent Supreme
Court decision of Addington v. Texas4" arguably requires this analysis.
Addington v. Texas
Addington held that, in civil commitment proceedings, the proof
by clear and convincing evidence satisfies constitutional due process
requirements.4 2 The Court noted, however, that the preponderance
standard is constitutionally inadequate in this context.43 Its reasoning
rested on an analysis of the function of a standard of proof. The Court
said:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in
the Due Process Clause . . . . is to "instruct the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have
in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication." . . . The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance
attached to the ultimate decision."
The Court then explored the three traditional standards of proof
and the types of proceedings to which each is appropriate.4 5 The Court
indicated that the preponderance standard, which requires the litigants
to share equally the risks of error, is appropriate in cases involving private monetary disputes because society has only a minimal concern
with the outcome.46 Proof by clear and convincing evidence, the Court
noted, is the standard that governs civil cases4 7 in which more substantial individual interests are at stake and in which public policy therefore favors protection of those interests.4 8 For instance, this standard
usually applies in cases involving allegations of civil fraud, and it
serves to reduce the risk of injury to the defendant's reputation. 49 Finally, the Court observed that the reasonable doubt standard is gener41. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). The appellant inAddington was committed to a mental hospital
based on clear and convincing evidence that commitment would best protect him and others.

The appellant, however, claimed that use of the clear and convincing evidence standard
violated his due process rights. Id. at 421-22.

42.
43.
44.
45.

1d.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 433.
at 427.
at 423 (citation omitted).
at 423-25.

46. Id. at 423.

47. Juvenile proceedings are technically civil actions although they are quasi-criminal in
nature. In Winship, the Supreme Court eschewed the rigidity of the civil/criminal classifica-

tions, and, as noted, prescribed the criminal standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt)
for juvenile adjudicatory proceedings. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
48. 441 U.S. at 424.
49. Id.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 41

ally reserved for criminal cases."0 In these cases, the interests of the
criminal defendant are of such magnitude that society has chosen to
nearly exclude the possibility of an error that would prejudice those
5
interests. '
After examining the roles of the various standards in allocating the
risks of erroneous decisions, the Court indicated that the societal and
individual interests at stake in a particular type of case should determine the standard of proof employed in that type of case.5" While considering the interests involved in Addington, the Court pointed out that
an individual threatened with commitment has a strong interest in preserving his liberty and in avoiding the stigma attached to commitment.53 On the other hand, the Court noted that the government has
no interest in civilly committing anyone not mentally ill, although it
has an interest in protecting society from the dangerously ill.54 The
Court decided that in this situation the individual should not be required to share equally with society the risk of error.5 5 It concluded
that "due process requires the state to justify confinement by proof
more substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence."56
The Addington analysis seems to apply to any judicial proceeding.
The notion of balancing interests is a familiar one. The more interesting aspect of Addington is its suggestion that fundamental fairness demands that the risks of judicial proceedings be skewed to favor the
more substantial of the interests at stake.
In response to Addington, several state courts have held that due
process requires a clear and convincing standard of proof in cases determining parental and custodial rights.5 1 Similarly, several have
adopted that standard for proceedings dealing with the sterilization of
incompetent minors, 58 although as Judge Wilner noted, "[lIt is difficult
to imagine any lesser test ever being valid in such a case."5 9

50. Id. at 423-24.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 423-25.
53. Id. at 425-26.
54. Id. at 426.
55. Id. at 427.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1980). But see Custody of a Minor, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2124, 393 N.E.2d 379 (1979).
58. See, e.g., In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 414 A.2d 541 (1980); In re Grady, 426 A.2d
467 (N.J. 1981).
59. In re Randolf T., No. 645, slip op. at 4 (Wilner, J., dissenting).

19811

IN RE RANDOLF

T. AND IN RE BOBBY C.

THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS DECISIONS IN RANDOLF

T.

AND BOBBY C.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals refused to use the Addington analysis in Randolf T. and Bobby C. Because Addington involved a
civil commitment proceeding, the court found it neither authoritative
nor persuasive in the context of juvenile waiver proceedings. 6° The
court stressed that a civil commitment proceeding determines whether
someone will be deprived of his liberty and that the waiver hearing
does not reach this question. 6 The court asserted that no stigma attaches to a waived juvenile until and unless he is found guilty in adult
court.62 Finally, the court concluded that, in the absence of any
Supreme Court determination of which standard satisfies due process
in a waiver hearing, it was unwilling to overturn the legislative judgment that the preponderance standard is adequate.63 Accordingly, it
upheld the legislatively prescribed standard.
Although the Court of Special Appeals adopted the same reasoning in both RandofT and Bobby C.,6 4 the unreported Rando/f opinion
contained a strong dissent by Judge Wilner. He argued that the Addington analysis applied to the waiver process.6" Relying in part on
Kent, he characterized waiver as a critical event involving substantial
individual and societal interests.6 6 Although he mentioned that preserving public safety is a legitimate societal interest, he pointed out that
the public has an equal interest in maintaining the juvenile court's jurisdiction over all children amenable to juvenile rehabilitative treatment. 67 He characterized the child's interest as definite and
substantial, 68 noting that a decision to waive the child to adult court
exposes him to the risk of incarceration in an adult prison and to the
consequences of having a criminal record.6 9 Wilner concluded that the
waiver decision should be based on clear and convincing evidence.70
Indeed, the waiver process does determine vitally important
60. 48 Md. App. at 253, 426 A.2d at 438; No. 645, slip op. at 9-10.
61. 48 Md. App. at 253, 426 A.2d at 438; No. 645, slip op. at 9-10.
62. 48 Md. App. at 254, 426 A.2d at 439; No. 645, slip op. at 11.
63. 48 Md. App. at 254, 426 A.2d at 439; No. 645, slip op. at 11-12.
64. Compare 48 Md. App. 249, 426 A.2d 435, cert. granted, No. 47 (Md. July 2, 1981)
with No. 645 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 17, 1981), cert. granted,No. 25 (Md. May 27, 1981).
65. No. 645, slip op. at I (Wilner, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id. at 6-7.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 7-8.
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rights. 7 Juvenile jurisdiction protects the youth from publicity,7 2 limits
confinement up to the age of majority,7 3 and protects against the consequences of an adult conviction.7 4 Even if the accused is acquitted by a
criminal court, his adult arrest record may produce employment
problems.7 5 Although waiver does not automatically deprive the juvenile of his liberty, it does expose him to the risk of pre-trial confinement
in an adult facility for up to 180 days.7 6 In contrast, a child awaiting a
delinquency adjudication can be detained no more than sixty days77
and cannot be confined in an adult detention facility.7 8 Moreover, the
juvenile who has been waived to criminal court has been stigmatized as
an "unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures."7 9 In sum, as the
fourth circuit has said, "[Ilt seems . . . nothing can be more critical to
the accused than determining whether there will be a guilt determining
process in an adult-type criminaltrial."8
The standard of clear and convincing proof would reinforce the
theoretical presumption that every child should remain in the juvenile
court system. The presumption of amenability to rehabilitation has
82
8
been recognized by the Maryland legislature, the Maryland courts,
the Supreme Court, 83 and the social philosophy that justifies a separate

juvenile justice system.84 Despite this theoretical presumption, as a
practical matter the state's petitions for waiver are rarely denied, at
least in Baltimore City. Statistics demonstrate that of 326 waiver hearings held during the calendar year 1980, only 46 waiver petitions were

71. Schomhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction.- Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J.
583 (1968); Gasper & Katkin, A Rationaleforthe Abolition of the Juvenile Court's Power to
Waive Jurisdiction,7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 938 (1980); Comment, Juvenile Court Waiver." The
Questionable Validity ofExisting Statutory Standards, 16 ST. Louis L.J. (1972); Comment,
Due Process and Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 591 (1973).
72. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN § 3-812(c) (1980).
73. Id. § 3-806.
74. Id. § 3-824.
75. But see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 737 (1976), which gives an acquitted defendant a
right to file a petition to have an arrest record expunged.
76. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 616D (1976). See also State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403
A.2d 356 (1979).
77. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-815(c) (Supp. 1980).
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. § 3-815(d).
See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-817(c) (1980), quoted at n.4 supra.
Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 1970) (emphasis in original).
See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-802-804 (1980).
82. See In re Barker, 17 Md. App. 714, 717, 305 A.2d 211, 213 (1973).
83. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560-61 (1966).
84. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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denied.8 5 In short, the principle merit of a higher standard of proof is
that it might help to preserve the presumption of amenability to rehabilitation in fact as well as in theory.
An increased standard of proof might also serve to fortify a process that otherwise might be regarded as perfunctory. Witnesses are
rarely produced in waiver hearings, 6 and the average length of a
waiver hearing is approximately fifteen minutes.8 7 This sort of proceeding does not bespeak the critical importance that the Supreme
Court has attributed to waiver hearings. Increasing the burden of
proof at least might impress the juvenile judge with the gravity of his
decision.
The Addington analysis was framed in language that makes its reasoning applicable to any judicial proceeding. Other courts have responded to Addington by re-evaluating the standard of proof in a
variety of legal proceedings.8 " Unfortunately the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals refused to follow this trend.
Its refusal is contrary to the spirit of both Addington and the Kent,
Gault, Winsh v trilogy of juvenile cases. It is also inconsistent with the
basic thrust of the juvenile justice system - to seek the rehabilitation
rather than the punishment of juvenile offenders. Because the Court of
Appeals has granted certiorari in Randof T and Bobby C., it may still
reclaim the important social and constitutional principles that the
Court of Special Appeals rejected.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COURT'S DECISION NOT TO PUBLISH
IN RE RA4NDOLF T

Randoif T. is significant, not only because of the substantive issue
with which it deals, but also because its non-publication raises questions regarding a court's responsibility to publish dissenting opinions.
When a Maryland court chooses not to report an opinion, the unreported opinion may "not be cited by a court or party for any purpose,
85. Interview with Barbara Daily, Chief of the Interagency Liason Division of the Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, in Baltimore, (Oct. 2, 1981).
Ms. Daily noted that 128 scheduled waiver hearings resulted in court-controlled
commitments in which the juvenile admitted the charges in exchange for the state withdrawing its waiver petition. Although it seems somewhat inappropriate for prosecutors to use the
waiver petition as leverage in plea bargaining, the ethical propriety of that practice is beyond the scope of this paper.
86. Interview with Richard Bartholomee, Chief of the Juvenile Division of the Baltimore City Public Defender's Office, in Baltimore, (Sept. 24, 1981).
87. Interview with Steven Cohen, Deputy Chief of the Juvenile Division of the Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office, in Baltimore, (Oct. 1, 1981).
88. See notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text supra.
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in any unrelated action or proceeding." 9
The proponents of non-publication advance two primary justifications for not reporting opinions: (1) non-publication reduces the cost of
producing published opinions; and (2) non-publication reduces the
time devoted to opinion writing.90 Critics of non-publication, however,
have noted that the practice of not reporting opinions "will effect a
pernicious diminution in both judicial responsibility and judicial accountability."'" This criticism does not apply to the Court of Special
Appeals' decision not to publish Randolf T, because by publishing
Bobby C., the court made itself publicly accountable for the majority's
reasoning in Randolf T. Indeed, Bobby C., a unanimous opinion, is
92
practically indistinguishable from the majority opinion in Randolf T.
However, the non-publication of Randolf does raise a significant problem, for it has removed from public scrutiny Judge Wilner's well-reasoned dissent.
As Chief Justice Hughes once noted, a dissent is "an appeal to the
brooding spirit of the law."9 3 It affords a dissatisfied member of the
court an opportunity to criticize the position taken by the majority and
to ask "for correction from those with power to do so - a higher court,
the Congress, or 'the intelligence of a future day.' "9' Thus, a dissent
may help shape the course of the law not only by influencing later judicial decisions, but also by inspiring constitutional amendments or
89. MD. R.P. 1092(c).
90. Smith, The Selective Publication of Opinions- One Court's Experience, 32 ARK. L.
REV. 25, 28-30 (1978).
91. Reynolds & Richman, The Non-PrecedentialPrecedent - Limited Publication and
No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1199
(1978). The article notes that because superior courts can review only a limited number of
cases, the real check on intermediate appellate courts comes from the bench, the bar, the
scholars, and the public. "Unpublished opinions ... will generally not receive critical commentary from those groups for the obvious reason that they will go unnoticed." Id. at 1203.
Thus, non-publication significantly diminishes judicial accountability by rendering this type
of control less effective. Id. at 1202. See also Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publicationin the United States Courts ofAppeals:- The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 573, 581 (1981).
92. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
93. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928), quoted in
Stephens, The Function of Concurringand Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last Resort, 5 U.
FLA. L. REV. 394, 404 (1952). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) (" '[R]ight conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly;
but we have staked upon it our all.'" (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.)).
94. Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publicationin the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979
DUKE L.J. 807, 829 (quoting C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68
(1928)).
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changes in statutory law. 95

Perhaps a risk analysis is appropriate in this context, as it was in
Addington. By choosing not to publish an opinion that contains a dissent, the court maximizes the risk that an erroneous decision will be
regarded as controlling - by the bench, the bar, and the legislature.
On the other hand, publication entails no real risk. Only a small minority of opinions contain dissents; 96 thus the financial cost of publishing these opinions is negligible. Furthermore, in any case in which the
court is split, surely it is not wasting judicial energy to require the
judges to articulate their opposing views carefully for presentation to
the public.
It is clear that if a dissenting opinion remains unpublished, the
value of the opinion will most certainly be lost. Thus the question
arises whether courts should be required to publish all decisions accompanied by a dissent. William Reynolds and William Richman addressed this question in a recent article.9 7 They argued that courts
should adopt rules mandating publication of both dissenting and concurring opinions. Such rules would not only serve to guide the proper
evolution of the law, but would also "assure a forum for any issue
about which a judge feels strongly enough to dissent or concir." 98
Even those cases that the court would characterize as lacking legal significance or public importance probably warrant publication when they
are accompanied by dissents.99 Reynolds and Richman noted that
"[wihile such opinions break no new ground, they do reveal the presence of intellectual ferment and independent thought on the court[,]
... phenomena that the bar and the public should be able to
observe.""°
The Maryland courts should consider adopting such a rule, for
without rules requiring the publication of dissenting and concurring
opinions, it is possible that many valuable opinions will be forever hidden from the public eye. Judge Wilner's dissent from Randoif T. is a
case in point.

95. See Stephens, supra note 93, at 405-07.
96. Each year approximately ten unreported Court of Special Appeals decisions contain
dissents. Interview with David L. Terzian, Deputy Clerk of the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, in Annapolis, (Oct. 6, 1981).
97. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 91.
98. Id. at 832-33.
99. Id. at 832.
100. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The Maryland Court of Appeals will be considering the substantive question raised by Randof T. and Bobby C., for the court has
granted certiorari in both cases. The only appeal that lies from the
Court of Special Appeals' decision not to report RandoifT., however, is
an appeal to the conscience of the court.

ADDENDUM

Since this issue of the Maryland Law Review went to the printer, the Court of Appeals
announced its decisions in Bobby C. and Randolph T. In re Bobby C., No. 47 (Md. Dec. 7,
1981); In re Randolph T., No. 25 (Md. Dec. 4, 1981). The Bobby C. decision was issued
without opinion, presumably because the Randolph T. opinion contained the court's reasoning in resolving both cases. In Randolph T the court seemed to be concerned primarily with
Randolph's argument that the waiver proceeding ought to be governed by the reasonable
doubt standard. No. 25, Slip op. at 16-20. The court did not deal adequately with the question whether the waiver hearing determines such important issues that the clear and convincing standard ought to apply. The court merely said:
[Tlhe juvenile is in a much different position than the individual about to be committed
to a mental institution as in Addington, the parent to be permanently separated from his
child, the young woman who is to be sterilized, or the persons subject to deportation or
denaturalization which the Chief Justice mentioned in his discussion for the Court in
Addington. The court proceeding in each of those cases is a final determination of the
person's status. Randolph T. is being removed from the juvenile justice system, but that
removal does not determine his ultimate status. That will come only after due trial.
Id. at 20-24.
The weakness in the court's position is immediately apparent. Although waiver does
not determine a juvenile's ultimate status, the waived juvenile ordinarily cannot reopen the
question at issue in the waiver proceeding - the question of his fitness for juvenile rehabilitative measures. Once waived to the adult court, he will be treated as an adult; and if he is
found guilty, he probably has forever lost his opportunity for treatment in accordance with
juvenile rehabilitative measures. Accordingly, an erroneous waiver decision does affect important individual and societal interests. The court should have evaluated whether, in light
of those interests, the waiver standard adequately minimizes the risk of an erroneous
decision.

INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN MAR YLAND
A majority of states have discarded the common law doctrine of
interspousal immunity either partially or completely' but Maryland
courts have been reluctant to break with the past. 2 In Schlesinger v.
Schlesinger,3 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals continued to re-

sist any significant change in this state's position on interspousal immunity,4 and the Court of Appeals denied certiorari in the case.- Because

the traditionally proffered rationales no longer persuasively support the
doctrine,6 the Court of Appeals should have heard Schlesinger and abrogated interspousal immunity, a vestige of outdated common law. Although Maryland precedent supports the doctrine,7 the Court of

Appeals is bound by common law principles only to the extent that
those principles enjoy continuing viability in modem society.
THE STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE IN MARYLAND

In Schlesinger v. Schlesinger,8 Mrs. Schlesinger alleged six counts
of willful, malicious, or intentional conversion of her property and incorporated them into the final allegation of her complaint - intentional infliction of emotional distress.9 Mrs. Schlesinger asserted that
the various acts committed against her property interests' ° were part of
1.See 17 J. FAM. L. 810, 812 (1979).
2. Article V of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: "That the inhabitants of
Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England,. . .and to the benefit of such of the
English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six
.... Md. Const. art. V. Because interspousal immunity comprised part of the common
law of England as of July 4, 1776, the doctrine was incorporated into Maryland law under
Article V. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 443. Thus, the doctrine of interspousal
immunity has prevented tort suits between Maryland spouses since 1867, when the Maryland Constitution was adopted.
3. No. 1646 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 7, 1981), cert. denied, No. 168 (Md. July 14,
198 1). The opinion of the Court of Special Appeals was not published.
4. Maryland has permitted only a narrowly limited exception to the general rule that
spouses may not sue one another in tort. In Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77
(1978), the Maryland Court of Appeals permitted a woman to sue her husband for an outrageous, intentional tort. See notes 33 to 43 and accompanying text infra.
5. No. 168 (Md. July 14, 1981).
6. See notes 53 to 78 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 29 to 43 and accompanying text infra.
8. No. 1646 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 7, 1981), cert. denied, No. 168 (Md. July 14,
1981).
9. Brief for Appellant at 3-7.
10. Mrs. Schlesinger alleged that her husband "intentionally, maliciously and wilfully
converted" $292,000 worth of her property to his own personal use. Brief for Appellant at 4.
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her husband's plan to intentionally inflict such mental distress as to
cause her hospitalization for both mental and physical conditions."

To support her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
Mrs. Schlesinger not only cited two incidents of assault committed by

her husband,' 2 but she also alleged that he "falsified her signatures;
concealed her records; made false charges against her; ousted her from
her home; retained her property. . .; caused her hospitalization...;
and knowing of her illness, ...
persisted in such continuing
acts. . . .", The Court of Special Appeals later found that Dr. Schlesinger's conduct was not sufficiently "outrageous"' 4 to fall within the
exception created by Lusby v. Lusby, 5 in which the Court of Appeals

6
had permitted an interspousal suit for an outrageous, intentional tort.'

Under traditional common law a tort obligation could not exist
between spouses because marriage was considered to create a single
legal entity. 7 A wife could sue and be sued only with her husband; she
could not sue her spouse in either tort or contract because he necessarily would be a party to both sides of the action.'" Similarly, a hus-

band's liability was always substituted for his wife's; thus, if he brought
a tort action against his spouse, he would be suing himself.'9
For a list of the items involved, see Record Extract at 46-49, Schlesinger v. Schlesinger, No.
1646 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 7, 1981).
11. Brief for Appellant at 7.
12. Mrs. Schlesinger alleged that on November 3, 1975, her husband arrived home while
she was in the family room reading and drinking a glass of liqueur. She claimed that Dr.
Schlesinger "took the glass from her hand; poured the liqueur over her head; broke the glass
against the wall; threatened her by holding a piece of glass to her throat; and demanded with
a fireplace poker that she choose one of three ultimata regarding the course of their future
relationship." Schlesinger v. Schlesinger, No. 1197, slip op. at 3, 4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May
26, 1980). (This appeal followed the divorce action Mrs. Schlesinger filed against her husband in Montgomery County Circuit Court.) Mrs. Schlesinger also alleged that her husband
attempted to both rape and choke her later that same evening. Id at 4.
According to Mrs. Schlesinger, the second assault occurred on November 30, 1975,
when her husband began to beat her without provocation. Mrs. Schlesinger's attempts to
obtain help were unsuccessful but a neighbor eventually alerted the police who arrived later
that evening. Id at 5.
13. Brief for Plaintiff at 8, Schlesinger v. Schlesinger, No. 50649 (Md. Cir. Ct., Montgomery County Nov. 28, 1979). The Circuit Court later dismissed Mrs. Schlesinger's claims
without leave to amend.
14. No. 1646, slip op. at 7-8.
15. 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978).
16. Id at 335, 390 A.2d at 77.
17. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 442; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF

TORTS § 8.10 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
18. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 122, at 859-61.

19. Id
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The Married Women's Emancipation (or Property) Acts 20 revised
the common law in all fifty states, 2' including Maryland. These statutes generally have been interpreted to give married women the right to
own and control property and to sue and be sued with respect to prop-

erty disputes without joinder of their husbands.22
Although the statutes give married women the right to sue in tort
as if they were unmarried,23 only a few states have interpreted them to

enable women to sue and be sued for all torts.24 A majority,25 including Maryland, 26 determined that the Acts did not affect the common
law doctrine of interspousal immunity. 27 These courts reasoned that
such a radical change in the well-established common law rule could be

20. See McCurdy, PersonalInjury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REv. 303, 310
(1959) [hereinafter cited as PersonalInftury Torts]; PROSSER, supra note 17, § 122, at 861-64.
See also McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030
(1930).
21. PersonalInjury Torts, supra note 20, at 310.
22. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 17, at 643-44; PROSSER, supra note 17, § 122, at
865.
23. Maryland's Act typifies these statutes:
Married Women shall have power to engage in any business and to contract, whether
engaged in business or not, and to sue upon their contracts, and also to sue for the
recovery, security or protection of their property, andfor torts committed against them,
asfully as if they were unmarried.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 5 (1957) (emphasis added).
24. See Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124
Ark. 167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Brown v.
Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926).
At least two courts initially interpreted the Acts so literally that they permitted women to sue their husbands in tort but forbade husband's tort actions against their wives.
They reasoned that the statutory language specifically conferred rights only to women and
could not include men. Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Fehr v.
General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944).
After these decisions, both states' legislatures quickly enacted corrective statutes. In
response to Scholtens, the North Carolina legislature adopted 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 263,
§ 52-10.1 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1976)). The statute provides that
"husband and wife have a cause of action against each other to recover damages sustained
to their person or property as if they were unmarried."
After Fehr, the Wisconsin legislature in 1947 enacted Wis. STAT. ANN. § 246.075
(West 1957) (current renumbered version at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.075 (West 1981 Supp.))
This statute provides: "A husband shall have and may maintain an action against his wife
for the recovery of damages for injuries sustained to his person caused by her wrongful act,
neglect or default." See Campbell, Wisconsin Law Governing Automobile Accidents-Part
11, 1962 Wis. L. REV. 557, 592.
25. See, e.g., Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Rogers v. Rogers, 265
Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915).
26. Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927). See notes 29 to 32 and
accompanying text infra.
27. See Annot., 29 A.L.R. 1482 (1924).
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accomplished only through clear and unequivocal statutory language. 2
Because the statutes did not express a clear legislative intent to abrogate, interspousal immunity remained intact.
In Furstenburg v. Furstenburg,29 the Maryland Court of Appeals
denied Mrs. Furstenburg the right to sue her husband for injuries she
incurred as a result of his negligent operation of their automobile.3"
The court concluded that Maryland's legislature did not intend the
Married Women's Property Act to authorize interspousal suits.3 ' According to the court, the Act was designed to permit a woman to instisuits she was previously required to bring in that
tute, in her own 3name,
2
husband.
of her
Lusby v. Lusby 33 represents the only step taken by the Maryland
Court of Appeals to abrogate interspousal immunity. In Lusby, the
court permitted an interspousal suit for an "outrageous, intentional
' 34
The plaintiff, Diana Lusby, alleged that while she was driving
tort."
her automobile on a public highway, her husband, Gerald, pulled his
truck alongside her vehicle and aimed a rifle in her direction. 35 Another truck, occupied by two men who Mrs. Lusby did not know,
forced her vehicle off the road and to a stop.36 Mr. Lusby then forced
his way into her car and began to drive, followed by the two unidentified men.3 7 Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Lusby was compelled to enter her
28. See, e.g., Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 252-53, 136 A. 534, 535-36
(1927).
The Supreme Court also adopted this reasoning in Thompson v. Thompson, 218
U.S. 611 (1910). In Thompson, the Court held that the District of Columbia's Married Women's Act, ch. 854, § 1155, 31 Stat. 1374 (1901) (repealed D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-208 (Supp.
IV 1977)), permitted a wife to maintain only those actions that the common law required be
brought jointly by spouses, 218 U.S. at 617. The Court refused to allow an interspousal suit,
which was barred by common law. The majority reasoned that "such radical and far-reaching changes should only be wrought by language so clear and plain as to be unmistakable
evidence of the legislative intention." Id at 618.
Several courts that held that the Acts did not affect interspousal immunity cited
Thompson for support. See, e.g., Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 73, 100 So. 591, 593 (1924);
Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382, 384 (1915).
29. 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927).
30. Id at 252-53, 136 A. at 535-36.
31. Id, 136 A. at 536.
32. Id The court reasoned that the Property Act of 1898 could only have dealt with
married women's property interests, because if the 1898 statute concerned other areas of the
law, the Act of 1900, which granted women the right to sue in contract actions, would have
been superfluous.
33. 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). For commentary on this decision, see 8 U. BALT.
L. REV. 584 (1980).
34. 283 Md. at 335, 390 A.2d at 77.
35. Id
36. Id
37. Id at 336, 390 A.2d at 77.
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husband's truck where Mr. Lusby struck her, "tore [her] clothes off and
did forcefully and violently, despite [her] desperate attempts to protect
38
herself, carnally know her against her will and without her consent.
Mr. Lusby then aided his two companions in their attempts to rape his
wife.39
The Court of Appeals permitted Mrs. Lusby's action for her husband's outrageous conduct,4 0 but emphasized that it was not overruling
previous decisions which had precluded interspousal suits.4 The court

distinguished these prior decisions from Lusby because only Lusby involved allegations of intentional tort.42 However, by doing so, the
Lusby majority ignored language in prior decisions stating that the
doctrine of interspousal immunity applied regardless of whether the
tort was intentional or not.4 3 Thus, the Lusby court implicitly modified
several holdings it ostensibly preserved and created an exception, albeit
limited, to Maryland's interspousal immunity doctrine.
In her appeal, Mrs. Schlesinger characterized the real issue in her
case as the application of the Lusby exception to intentional torts generally." Thus, although the plaintiff did not ask the court to abandon
interspousal immunity in interspousal tort suits involving negligence,
she did ask the court to apply Lusby to intentional torts which were not
outrageous. In its per curiam opinion, however, the court flatly refused
to expand the Lusby decision to encompass "mere" intentional torts.4 5
38. Id
39. Id However, no criminal charges are pending against Mr. Lusby, because in Maryland and 43 other states it is legal for a husband to rape his wife if the couple is living
together. Griffin, In 44 States It's Legal to Rape Your Wfe, STUDENT LAW., Sept., 1980, at
58.
40. 283 Md. at 335, 390 A.2d at 77.
41. Id. at 358, 390 A.2d at 89. See also 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 584 (1979).
42. 283 Md. at 358, 390 A.2d at 89. See Stokes v. Taxi Operators Ass'n, 248 Md. 690,
237 A.2d 762 (1968) (Maryland court refused to allow wife, a paying customer in a cab
operated by her husband, to recover for damages resulting from his negligence); David v.
David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932) (Maryland wife denied right to sue her husband and
the business in which he was a partner for negligence); Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md.
247, 136 A. 534 (1927) (interspousal suit arising from auto accident not permitted).
43. The Lusby majority concluded that "[flor purposes of our decision here today, however, we need not be involved with statutory construction nor need we be involved with our
prior cases other than for dicta appearing in them to the effect that one spouse may not sue
another for tort." 283 Md. at 357-58, 390 A.2d at 89. However, the Lusby court failed to
acknowledge that the doctrine of interspousal immunity was recited in various Maryland
cases as a common law rule which applied regardless of whether the tort was intentional.
See Stokes v. Taxi Operators Ass'n, 248 Md. 690, 691-92, 237 A.2d 762, 763 (1968); David v.
David, 161 Md. 532, 534, 157 A. 755, 756 (1932); Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247,
249, 136 A. 534, 534 (1927).
44. Reply Brief for Appellant at 5.
45. No. 1646, slip op. at 7-8 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 7, 1981). However, the Court of
Special Appeals reversed the lower court's decision regarding Mrs. Schlesinger's property
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The court reasoned that had the Court of Appeals intended Lusby to
apply "indiscriminately in every case involving an intentional tort," it
would have said so. 46 Although the Schlesinger court failed to interpret
Lusby as an indication that the Court of Appeals wanted to eliminate
interspousal immunity in Maryland, the Lusby majority's expansive
language arguably suggested that the court was preparing to abolish
interspousal immunity. For instance, the Lusby court quoted at length
from Justice Harlan's dissent in Thompson v. Thompson, 47 in which the
justice criticized the majority for upholding the doctrine despite the
passage of the District of Columbia's Married Women's Property Act.48
The Lusby majority also discussed the "parade of cases in which courts
have altered the previous common law rule"' 49 and noted legal commentators' nearly unanimous disapproval of interspousal immunity.5"
Finally, the Lusby majority concluded by observing that "[tihe General
Assembly has not heeded suggestions by this Court that a new statute
be enacted."'" Thus, one could argue that Lusby's tone reflected a
greater willingness on the part of the Court of Appeals to abrogate the
doctrine than was recognized by the Court of Special Appeals in
Schlesinger.
However, the Court of Special Appeals held in Schlesinger that
Lusby must be construed narrowly to allow recovery only for outrageous and intentional conduct of the type illustrated by that case.52
The appellate court's interpretation of Lusby and the refusal of the
Court of Appeals to grant certiorari are unfortunate because the doctrine no longer serves a useful purpose in modem society, and, therefore, should be discarded.

interests. The appellate court remanded the case, directing that it be transferred to an equity
court for resolution of those issues. Thus, the court's decision was anomalous: it allowed
Mrs. Schlesinger to sue in tort for wrongs to her property interests, but refused to permit suit
for alleged wrongs to her person. Accord, Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 623 (1910)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. No. 1646, slip op. at 7.
47. 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. 283 Md. at 353-57, 390 A.2d at 86-88 (quoting Thompson, 218 U.S. at 621-24
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
49. Id at 346, 390 A.2d at 83.
50. Id at 350, 390 A.2d at 84.
51. Id at 357, 390 A.2d at 88.
On January 14, 1981, Senator Crawford introduced a bill into the Maryland Senate
which proposed to abolish interspousal immunity with respect to intentional torts "under
certain circumstances." S.B. 188, Md. S. (1981) (emphasis added). The bill, however, died
in committee during the 1981 legislative session.
52. No. 1646, slip op. at 8.
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CRITIQUE OF THE RATIONALES SUPPORTING THE DOCTRINE

Throughout the last fifty years, Maryland courts have maintained
that only the legislature may alter the doctrine of interspousal immunity.53 Other jurisdictions, however, have proffered additional justifications for the continued prohibition of interspousal tort suits. First,
some courts have reasoned that allowing such actions would violate
public policy by promoting marital disharmony.54 Second, other courts
have contended that because the criminal and divorce laws already
provide the disgruntled spouse with adequate remedies, married
couples have no reason to sue each other in tort." Finally, some have
maintained that the danger of collusion between spouses is great
enough to preclude interspousal suits.5 6
A majority of jurisdictions have now recognized that courts and
legislatures can neither create, nor preserve, harmonious marital relations through the doctrine of interspousal immunity. 7 The Washington Supreme Court summarized this reasoning in Freehe v. Freehe:5 8
If a state of peace and tranquility exists between the spouses, then
the situation is such that. . . the spouses - who are, after all, the
best guardians of their own peace and tranquility - will allow the
action to continue only so long as their personal harmony is not
jeopardized. If peace and tranquility are nonexistent or tenuous to
begin with, then the law's imposition of a technical disability
seems more likely to be a bone of contention than a harmonizing
factor.5 9
Some courts have cited the widespread availability of insurance to
counter the proposition that an action between spouses will impair domestic harmony.' Although an insured defendant will have to pay a
53. See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
54. See, e.g., Bums v. Bums, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974); Corren v. Corren, 47
So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
55. See, e.g., Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924) (Divorce and criminal
laws are remedies). See also Mims v. Mims, 305 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(Divorce laws provide adequate remedies).
56. See, e.g., Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).
57. See Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974); Brooks v.
Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); PROSSER, supra note 17, § 122, at 863; Reynolds,.4 Look at the InterspousalTort Immunity Doctrine in Texas After Bounds v. Caudle, 41
Tex. B.J. 153 (1978).
58. 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972) (en banc).
59. Id at 187, 500 P.2d at 774. See also Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 383
N.E.2d 888 (1978) (W. Brown, J., dissenting).
60. See Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970) ("[I]t must be
remembered when dealing with the question of conjugal harmony that today virtually every
owner of a motor vehicle . . . carries liability insurance coverage.") See also Rupert v.
Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); 3 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 183 (1971).
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premium, he will not be required to pay any judgment rendered against
him. Thus, when insurance coverage is available, an interspousal suit
cannot violate public policy by promoting marital discord. 6 1 At least
one court has hypothesized that potential threats to domestic harmony
may actually be greater if an existing cause of action between spouses is
disallowed when insurance is present. 62 This reasoning has prompted a
suggestion that interspousal suits should be permitted only where insurance coverage is available. 63 According to this view, when insurance is
unobtainable, compelling the married couple to assume adversary positions or ordering the payment of a judgment to one spouse from the
couple's joint assets will necessarily create marital discord.6 4
Proponents of interspousal immunity also contend that when a
couple lacks insurance coverage, divorce and criminal laws offer more
appropriate remedies to the unhappy spouse than does the common
law of torts;6 5 but this proposal is illogical and internally inconsistent.
Neither of the forementioned remedies compensate the injured party.66
Moreover, once a spouse is driven to file a divorce or criminal action,
there is little marital harmony left to protect. 67 Thus, it is inconsistent
to deny uninsured spouses the right to sue one another in tort and yet
encourage the couple to reconcile their differences using more drastic
methods. If a spouse would choose to avail oneself of the divorce or
criminal remedy, one must conclude that marital harmony no longer
prevails. Therefore, denying the couple the right to sue in tort would
serve no useful purpose.
The availability of insurance also has been cited to support the
continuing viability of interspousal immunity. 68 Some courts reason
that the more intimate the parties are, the greater the possibility of collusion and exaggerated claims designed to defraud an insurance company. 69 These jurisdictions have apparently accepted insurance
61. Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974). See Personal Injury Torts,
supra note 20; 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423 (1979); 14 J. FAM. L. 331 (1975).
62. Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970). See also Klein v. Klein,
58 Cal. 2d 692, 694-95, 376 P.2d 70,72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962).
63. 11 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1214, 1226 (1977).
64. Id at 1227.
65. Id at 1228.

66. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 122, at 862. Prosser also notes that ordinary negligence is
neither a crime nor a ground for divorce. Id § 122, at 863 n.45.
67. Id at 863.
68. See Bums v. Bums, Ill Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974); Thomas v. Herron, 20 Ohio
St. 2d 62, 253 N.E.2d 772 (1969).

69. Thomas v. Herron, 20 Ohio St. 2d 62, 253 N.E.2d 772 (1969). For a discussion of the
fraud and collusion argument, see Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 490, 267 A.2d 481, 485
(1972).
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company contentions that insurers have justifiably relied on interspousal immunity and are not prepared to adequately defend themselves against fraudulent claims.7"
A majority of courts,7 ' however, refuse to assume that the judiciary is so ineffectual that it cannot distinguish fraudulent from legitimate claims.7 2 By abolishing interspousal immunity, these courts have
shown that they consider the plight of an injured, insured spouse to be
more significant than an insurer's reliance.7 3 In the majority's view, the
insurance company is not tactically disadvantaged: because the company is free to attack the spouses' credibility, and because the couple's
testimony is extremely vulnerable to impeachment, the odds are remote
that a couple will successfully pursue a fraudulent claim.74
Insurance companies have reacted to the majority's viewpoint by
voicing increasing concern over their newly imposed liability.7 5 In an
attempt to protect themselves, insurance companies in several states
have inserted interspousal exclusion clauses in their policies. Nevertheless, their concern continues because such non-negotiable clauses are
vulnerable to attack as violative of a state's public policy. 76 Furthermore, at least one state court has hinted that such exclusions warrant
70. 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 333, 345 (1976).
In Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (Schauer, J.,
dissenting), the dissent expressed the view that courts should abrogate interspousal immunity with respect to intentional torts but not with respect to negligence. Because insurance
policies are much less likely to cover intentional torts, the dissent reasoned that there is
necessarily less chance of fraud in the case of an intentional tort, and thus less compulsion to
continue to recognize interspousal immunity. Id at 699-700, 376 P.2d at 75-76, 26 Cal. Rptr.
at 107-08. See also Bums v. Bums, Ill Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974).
Clearly this position is without merit. Courts are currently asked to deal with fraud
on a daily basis. Thus, it makes little sense to deny a valid claim simply because there is a
possibility that some future claim will be found in fraud.
71. 17 J. FAM. L. 810, 812 (1979).
72. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 188-89, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972) (citing Goode v.
Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 234, 361 P.2d 941, 945 (1961)).
73. See 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 333, 346 (1976). At least one commentator has noted that
complete abrogation of interspousal immunity would, in fact, benefit insurance companies
because expanded liability exposure would encourage families to purchase liability insurance to ensure that necessary financial resources are available to injured family members.
However, this author also observes that abolishing the doctrine may cause insurance companies to reduce or restrict the availability of such coverage. See, e.g., 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 661,
681 (1971).
74. See Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 21-22, 284 N.E.2d 794, 796-97 (1972); Merenoff
v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 553-54, 388 A.2d 951, 960-61 (1978); Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio
St. 2d 269, 272, 383 N.E.2d 888, 890-91 (1978) (W. Brown, J., dissenting).
75. See generally Casey, The Trend of Interspousaland ParentalImmunity-Cakewalk
Liability, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 321, 321-34 (1978).
76. 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 661, 681 (1979).
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closer scrutiny if interspousal immunity is abolished." Upon such examination, an exclusion clause could be held to violate a state's public

policy to encourage the compensation
of innocent, injured victims by
78
permitting interspousal tort suits.

THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN
MARYLAND

Resolving the issue whether interspousal immunity should be
abolished does not solve all controversies; jurisdictions disagree on who

is the proper party to make this change. Maryland courts have continually insisted that only the legislature can alter the docrine of interspousal immunity.7 9 Unfortunately, this attitude assumes that
abrogation of the doctrine is necessarily a legislative task.
Maryland courts are simply incorrect in their belief that only the

legislature can properly decide this issue. There is no sound reason why
interspousal immunity, a doctrine which sprang from the common law
and has been maintained and preserved by the courts, may not prop-

erly be modified or abandoned by the courts.8 0 As a judicially created
doctrine, it may be judicially destroyed."'
Courts across the country have not hesitated to abandon interspousal immunity without the benefit of legislative action. For example, in Immer v. Risko,82 the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted
that state's Married Women's Act 83 as leaving the common law of in-

77. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482, 544 P.2d 444 (1975). In this
case, the Montana Supreme Court suggested that any invalidation of interspousal immunity
would require closer examination of an insurance policy's spousal exclusion clause to determine its validity. Id at 488, 544 P.2d at 448. However, the Montana court refused to abolish interspousal immunity.
78. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jacober, 10 Cal. 3d 193, 205, 514 P.2d 953,
960, 110 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8-9 (1973).
An acceptable exclusion clause would eliminate only the liability of insurance companies. It could not prevent husbands and wives from suing one another; it could only
preclude them from collecting from an insurer.
79. See Stokes v. Taxi Operators Ass'n, 248 Md. 690, 237 A.2d 762 (1968); Hudson v.
Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961); Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A.2d 698
(1960); Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 135 A.2d 886 (1957); Arch v. Arch, II Md.
App. 395, 274 A.2d 646 (1971).
80. Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974). See Mosier v. Carney, 376
Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343 (1965); DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382
(1973) (Roberts, J., dissenting); PersonalInjury Torts, supra note 17, at 338.
81. Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 273, 383 N.E.2d 888, 891 (1978) (W.
Brown, J., dissenting).
82. 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970).
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-1 to -30 (West 1968). The act provides that: "Nothing in this
chapter contained shall enable a husband or wife to contract with or to sue each other,
except as heretofore, and except as authorized by this chapter." Id at § 37:2-5.
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terspousal immunity untouched.84 The court nevertheless maintained
that it could abolish the doctrine because the doctrine was part of the
state's common law, which has an inherent capacity for change. 85 Sim86
ilarly, the Washington Supreme Court concluded in Freehe v. Freehe
that because interspousal immunity had always depended upon the
common law for its continued vitality, the court would be neglecting its
judicial function if it waited for the legislature to change the doctrine.8 7
In Brooks v. Robinson,88 the Indiana Supreme Court noted that it could
not ignore society's social and legal needs, and therefore, it "should not
hesitate to alter, ' amend,
or abrogate the common law when society's
89
needs so dictate.

Maryland courts need not, however, look to other states to support
the argument that abrogation of interspousal immunity can and should
emanate from the judiciary. Maryland courts do not always feel bound
to wait for legislative action to initiate change in the common law. For
instance, the court accepted strict liability for injury from defective
products although neither Maryland common law nor any Maryland
statute previously had adopted that theory of products liability. 90
Moreover, in Pope v. Stale,9 1 the Court of Appeals noted that the
Maryland Constitution adopted English common law "only so far as it
could be made to fit and adjust itself to our local circumstances and
84. 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970). The court concluded that the New Jersey legislature had not intended to codify the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity through
the New Jersey Married Women's Act, but instead intended to leave the common law intact.
Id at 485-87, 267 A.2d at 483-84.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court expressed similar views in Lewis v. Lewis, 370
Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976), when it abrogated interspousal immunity with respect to
automobile negligence. In Brown v. Brown, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1779, 409 N.E.2d 717
(1980), the Massachusetts court extended Lewis to all forms of negligence. Thus, the doctrine of interspousal immunity has been abolished in negligence actions in Massachusetts,
with the exception of certain as yet undefined areas which the Brown court left to be developed on a case-by-case basis.
85. 56 N.J. at 487, 267 A.2d at 483.
86. 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
87. Id. at 189, 500 P.2d at 775-76.
88. 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972).
89. Id. at 23, 284 N.E.2d at 797. The Indiana court went on to abrogate interspousal
immunity, allowing a wife to sue her husband for negligence that occurred before they were
married.
90. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976). The
Phopps majority stressed that "we disagree with General Motors' argument that adoption of
strict liability would result in such a radical change of the rights of sellers and consumers
that the matter should be left to the Legislature." Id at 350, 363 A.2d at 962. The Court of
Appeals discussed this issue by implication in Grinder v. Bryans Road Building & Supply
Co., 290 Md. 687, 432 A.2d 453 (1981), when it observed that revision of common law "is
traditionally a matter for a state court of highest resort." Id at 707, 432 A.2d at 464.
91. 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979).
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peculiar institutions."9 2 The Pope court then applied this reasoning to
eliminate the common law crime of misprision.9 3 In Grinder v. Bryans
Road Building & Supply Co. ,4 the Court of Appeals invoked similar
reasoning to abrogate the common law rule that a final judgment
against a principal or his agent operates as an election and precludes
recovery from the other.9 5 Finally, the court observed in Adler v. American Standard Corp.96 that common law doctrines are "of course, subject to modification by judicial decision where this Court finds that
[they are] no longer suitable to the circumstances of our people."9 7 The
Adler court then held that Maryland would recognize a cause of action
for abusive discharge, despite the common law rule that an employment contract may be terminated at will.9"
Although other jurisdictions have recognized the speciousness of
traditional rationales supporting interspousal immunity, Maryland
courts have refused to follow this "parade of cases."9 9 Perhaps the reticence of Maryland's judiciary stems from an unwillingness to accept its
duty to change antiquated common law principles. Because the General Assembly has shown little inclination to modify the doctrine and
because traditional justifications for interspousal immunity are no
longer viable, the Court of Appeals should abolish the doctrine. By
denying certiorari in Schlesinger v. Schlesinger, the Court of Appeals
ignored a prime opportunity to perform that task.
92. Id at 341-42, 396 A.2d at 1073. It is interesting to note that the Pope court cited with
approval the decision of Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1973). 284
Md. at 342-43, 396 A.2d at 1073. In Flores, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that

the judiciary and not the legislature should abolish interspousal immunity.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

284 Md. at 352, 396 A.2d at 1078.
290 Md. 687, 432 A.2d 453 (1981).
Id. at 707-08, 432 A.2d at 464.
291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
Id. at 42-3, 432 A.2d at 471.
Id at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.

99. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. at 346, 390 A.2d at 83. See note 49 and accompanying text
supra.

